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DONOR ADVISED FUNDS: CHARITABLE SPENDING
VEHICLES FOR 21ST CENTURY PHILANTHROPY
Roger Colinvaux *
Abstract: The donor advised fund (DAF) is changing longstanding giving norms in
United States philanthropy. DAF contributions now account for around 8.4% of giving by
individuals in the U.S. Over half of those contributions go to national DAF sponsors that
have relationships with large commercial investment firms like Fidelity, Vanguard, and
Schwab. This Article seeks to advance the understanding of the donor advised fund and to
address two of the main policy questions: whether to require a mandatory distribution of
funds by DAFs and their sponsoring organizations and how to respond to the increased use of
DAFs for noncash charitable contributions. Part I of the Article provides a brief overview of
DAFs. Part II of the Article discusses the different ways DAFs are viewed—as quasi-private
foundations, public charity substitutes, or as catalysts for new charitable giving. Each view
suggests a different regulatory approach. Part III focuses distinctly on the national sponsoring
organization and the reason for its section 501(c)(3) status. The Article argues that as an
organization that fulfills its mission by spending, it is appropriate for policymakers to require
each fund to spend down contributions over a range of years. Part IV of the Article examines
the solicitation by DAF-sponsoring organizations of charitable contributions of property,
including privately traded stock, real estate, fine art, collectibles, and publicly traded
securities. The increasing use of DAFs for noncash contributions will accentuate the
problems of current law, which include a deduction for unrealized appreciation,
overvaluation of contributed property, uncertain benefits to charity, equity concerns, and
enforcement. Part IV argues that if Congress intends to retain the subsidy for property
contributions, DAFs present an opportunity to improve and lower the cost of the subsidy both
by reducing the amount of unrealized appreciation that may be deducted and by basing the
amount of the deduction for property contributions on the net benefit to charity.
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INTRODUCTION
The donor advised fund (DAF) is a modern fundraising phenomenon.
The idea is simple. A donor gives money to a sponsoring charity, takes a
tax deduction, and retains the ability to advise how the donated funds
will be distributed. The idea is so compelling that an astonishing five of
the top eleven recipients for charitable gifts in the United States are
sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds—with the Fidelity
Charitable Gift Fund first in the nation, topping United Way for this
honor in 2015. 1 There are over 1000 charities that sponsor more than
269,000 DAF accounts, holding over $78 billion. 2 The money is pouring
in, and likely will continue. In 2015, roughly 8.4% of all charitable
giving by individuals went to donor advised funds, 3 for a total of $22.26
billion. 4
1. The Schwab Charitable Fund is fourth, the Silicon Valley Community Foundation tenth, the
National Christian Foundation ninth and the Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program eleventh.
Peter Olsen Phillips & Brian O’Leary, The 2016 Philanthropy 400, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.philanthropy.com/specialreport/philanthropy-400-a-new-no-1/111
[https://perma.cc/GRZ4-FWJP] (listing the top 400 charities, measured by amount of contributions
received).
2. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2015 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT, “MARKET OVERVIEW”
(2016) [hereinafter NPT 2016 REPORT]. The data is for 2015. Over a two-year period, the number of
DAF accounts has grown by 24% (from 217,000 to 269,000 accounts) and total asset value held in
DAFs has grown by about 37% (from roughly $57 billion to $78 billion). NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC
TRUST, 2014 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT 3 (2014) [hereinafter NPT 2014 REPORT].
3. This percentage is determined by dividing total contributions ($22.26 billion) by total
individual giving for 2015 ($264.58 billion), as reported by Giving USA. See generally NPT 2016
REPORT, supra note 2; GIVING USA 2016: ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR
2015, 67 [hereinafter GIVING USA REPORT FOR 2015]. Prior to its 2015 report, the National
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The biggest and perhaps best-known DAF sponsors are national in
scope and often affiliated with large investment firms (like Fidelity,
Schwab, and Vanguard). The main activity of these national sponsoring
organizations (or NSOs) is to sponsor DAFs. Other DAF sponsors are
community foundations, which traditionally have a more local focus and
use DAFs as one of many fund types. Still other sponsoring
organizations are active charities like universities that use DAFs as a
fundraising tool to advance a single issue or purpose.5 DAFs of all kinds
are popular with donors because they promise efficiency, convenience,
and tax benefits.
Yet with success comes scrutiny. As DAFs’ share of the charitable
giving pie grows, questions arise. Are DAF contributions hurting other
public charities, depriving active causes of much needed funds? Are
DAFs substitutes for private foundations, and thus a loophole that avoids
the private foundation anti-abuse rules? Are DAFs attracting funds that
otherwise would have been privately consumed, and so a welcome
source for new charitable gifts? Do DAFs represent a hoarding or
stockpiling of funds with no use-by date?
These are all important questions and difficult to answer in a
conceptual vacuum. The DAF debate is in a confused state, in part
because there is no common understanding of what DAFs represent.
DAF sponsoring organizations are called public charities but, as grantmaking entities, seem more like private foundations. Further, because

Philanthropic Trust reported DAF contributions as a percentage of all gifts to charity, or “total
charitable giving,” which was somewhat misleading. “Total charitable giving,” as reported by
Giving USA, does not represent new gifts to the charitable sector. Rather, “total charitable giving”
measures all giving, including not only giving by individuals, but also by foundations, corporations,
and by bequest. To understand DAF contributions as a share of charitable gifts, what matters is not
DAF contributions as a percentage of “total charitable giving,” as that number is typically used, but
DAF contributions as a percentage of new giving, i.e., the percentage of all money flowing into the
charitable sector for the first time that goes to a donor advised fund. Only this percentage will
convey the significance of DAFs as a giving vehicle as compared to other choices donors have.
4. By comparison, in 2014, roughly 7.6% of all charitable giving by individuals went to donor
advised funds, for a total of $19.66 billion. NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2015 DONOR-ADVISED
FUND REPORT 4 (2015) [hereinafter NPT 2015 REPORT]. In 2013, roughly 7.2% of all charitable
giving by individuals was to donor advised funds, for a total of $17.28 billion. In 2012, DAFs
received $13.99 billion, and about $10 billion five years before that (2007). Id. at 5.
5. The National Philanthropic Trust divides sponsors into three categories: national sponsors,
community foundations, and single-issue sponsors. NPT 2016 Report, supra note 2, at 1. The
Treasury Department offers a similar taxonomy. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 21 (2011) [hereinafter
TREASURY REPORT] (noting that sponsoring organizations include “charitable organizations formed
by financial institutions for the principal purpose of offering DAFs, community foundations,
universities, [supporting organizations], and other tax-exempt organizations”).

05 - Colinvaux.docx (Do Not Delete)

42

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/21/2017 2:42 PM

[Vol. 92:39

not all DAF sponsoring organizations are the same, it is hard to
generalize. The difficulty in conceptualizing DAFs in turn leads to
considerable uncertainty about whether policymakers should respond to
their increased use.
This Article seeks to advance the understanding of the donor advised
fund by providing an analytical framework for how to conceptualize
DAFs, especially DAFs at national sponsoring organizations. 6 The
Article addresses two of the main policy questions: whether to require a
mandatory distribution of funds (a payout) by DAFs at NSOs, and how
to respond to the increased use of DAFs for noncash charitable
contributions.
Part I of the Article sets the stage with a general overview of donor
advised funds, types of DAF sponsoring organizations, and their recent
history through the rise of the NSO. Part II then discusses the different,
sometimes overlapping ways DAFs are viewed—as quasi-private
foundations, public charity substitutes, or as catalysts for new charitable
giving—each of which presents a different regulatory model. Part III
then focuses distinctly on the NSO and the reason for its section
501(c)(3) status. Part III argues that because NSOs fulfill their mission
by spending, it is appropriate to require a payout at the fund level. Part
IV then examines the active solicitation by sponsoring organizations (not
just NSOs) of charitable contributions of property, including privately
traded stock, real estate, fine art, collectibles, and publicly traded
securities. Part IV argues that if Congress intends to retain the subsidy
for property contributions, DAFs present an opportunity to improve and
lower the cost of the subsidy both by reducing the amount of unrealized
appreciation that may be deducted and by basing the amount of the
deduction (for all property contributions) on the net benefit to charity.
At the outset, it is important to identify the federal interest in
regulating DAFs. There is a clear federal interest in protecting against
abuse of the charitable deduction. Because donors receive a charitable
deduction for DAF contributions, the federal government has an interest
in ensuring that the funds are not directed to private use. 7 In addition, the

6. Donor advised funds at community foundations and single-issue sponsors merit separate
consideration. One of the anomalies of current law is that donor advised funds are defined and
regulated without regard to sponsor. DAFs, however, need not have uniform rules. Characteristics
of sponsoring organizations may be such that different rules should apply. Important definitional
questions will need to be addressed when sponsoring organizations are distinguished.
7. Clearly, charitable giving that mainly benefits the donor is charitable in name only and should
not be allowed, whatever the giving vehicle. As discussed in Part II, Congress has already adopted a
number of anti-abuse rules in the DAF context. Additional anti-abuse rules could be extensive. For
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government has a stake, not simply as a matter of taxation, but as a
matter of the public interest, in helping ensure a reasonably efficient and
equitable system of private charity. As measured by the huge sums
pouring into DAFs, they clearly matter to the 501(c)(3) sector as a whole
and to how charitable services are delivered in the U.S. Setting aside
abuse, the challenge is to adopt an affirmative public policy toward
donor advised funds, taking into account the unique characteristics of
DAFs to determine how they should operate within the philanthropic
system.
I.

DONOR ADVISED FUNDS AND SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS, IN GENERAL

This Part provides an overview of the donor advised fund as a
charitable giving vehicle, a description of the types of DAF sponsors,
and a snapshot of legal issues related to the modern development of the
national sponsoring organization.
A.

The Donor Advised Fund

Primarily, the DAF is a charitable fundraising device, a tool to
persuade donors to part with money that will be used for charitable
purposes. Some individuals considering a charitable gift might not be
ready, or willing, to make a contribution. Ideally, and perhaps as
originally conceived, the DAF is available for charities to persuade
otherwise reluctant donors to give.
A DAF attracts donors because of the advice feature. After making a
completed gift to a charity, a DAF permits donors to advise the charity
on an ongoing basis about how to distribute fund assets for charitable
purposes. 8 After the gift, the charity typically segregates donor funds
into a separate account in the donor’s name, 9 creating a vestige of
ownership. The donor then may “advise” the charity about recipients,
which must be other 501(c)(3) charities. 10 Thus, in a typical DAF
transaction, the donor contributes to the DAF sponsor and takes a federal
income tax deduction in Year 1. 11 Then, in a later year 12 the donor asks
example, a payout rule not consistent with perpetuity could fit under an anti-abuse heading, where
the abuse is defined as not making distributions quickly enough.
8. See generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN
ANALYSIS OF CHARITABLE GIVING AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 2 (2012).
9. See I.R.C. § 4966 (2012).
10. See id.
11. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012).
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that the funds be paid to some other 501(c)(3), like Harvard University,
Doctors Without Borders, the American Cancer Society, and so on.
Although the donor’s advice typically is followed, the advice is not
binding on the sponsoring charity (called a “sponsoring organization”),13
which formally owns and controls the funds. 14 If formal legal control
were not vested in the sponsoring organization, the gift would not be
considered complete and would fail. 15
In essence, DAFs offer a charitable contribution deduction for federal
income tax purposes in the year of the gift, but allow the donor to retain
power over the fund distribution. 16
B.

DAF Sponsors

There are roughly three types of DAF sponsors: community
foundations, NSOs, and single-issue sponsors.
Community foundations pioneered the DAF in the 1930s. 17
Community foundations historically existed to pool funds, often large
gifts, for the benefit of a particular community. 18 In that context, it is
12. The advice also could occur in the same year.
13. I.R.C. § 4966 (2012).
14. See SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that “[e]vidence suggests . . . that
donors to DAFs have effective control over grants, and to some extent investments, because
sponsoring organizations typically follow the donor’s advice”); TREASURY REPORT supra note 5, at
69 (noting that one respondent thought that DAFs “appear to give DAF donors de facto control over
investment and distribution decisions”).
15. See Sherlock, supra note 8, at 3.
16. The National Philanthropic Trust provides a good working definition of donor advised fund:
“A philanthropic giving vehicle administered by a charitable sponsor. A donor-advised fund allows
donors to establish and fund the account by making irrevocable, tax-deductible contributions to the
charitable sponsor. Donors then recommend grants from those funds to other charitable
organizations.” NPT 2016 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Compare, however, the description of DAFs
offered by Giving USA: “Donor-advised funds are investment vehicles used by individual donors to
make tax-deductible contributions earmarked for a specific charity.” GIVING USA REPORT FOR
2015, supra note 3, at 232. The reference to earmarking is incorrect: donor funds are not earmarked,
and donor advice formally need not be followed. The misstatement, though, points to the general
sense that DAFs are “owned” by the donors, not the charitable sponsor, and that donor advice is
followed. See, e.g., FIDELITY CHARITABLE, 2016 GIVING REPORT 4 (2016) [hereinafter FIDELITY
2016 REPORT] (using the possessive when stating that “[d]onors can support any IRS-qualified
public charities with the money in their donor-advised funds”).
17. The New York Community Trust is credited as creating the first donor advised fund in the
1930s. See Eleanor W. Sacks, The Growing Importance of Community Foundations, LILLY FAMILY
SCHOOL OF PHILANTHROPY 8 (2014), https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/files/file/the_growing_
importance_of_community_foundations-final_reduce_file_size_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9K57AUTD].
18. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10) (describing in general terms the characteristics of a
community foundation).
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easy to see how the idea of a DAF would arise and evolve. A DAF
promised the donor professional fund management and the ability to
work with the community foundation to remain involved with how the
funds were spent. 19 Importantly, DAFs were and are but one tool used
by community foundations to encourage gifts. 20 For donors willing to
give with no retained involvement, a DAF would not be necessary.
Today, community foundations are the most numerous of DAF sponsors
(60%) yet hold a smaller proportion (25.3%) of DAF accounts. 21
DAFs remained relatively obscure until the rise of the national
sponsoring organization (NSO) in the 1990s. 22 NSOs are public charities
with a national focus that administer DAFs as their main activity. 23
Under the NSO model, raising funds through a DAF is the reason the
charity exists—i.e., the DAF as a fundraising device is the end, not a
means. This is a significant departure from the historical norm, in which
DAFs were housed within a charity that had a distinct charitable
mission.
Many NSOs are affiliated with large investment firms, like Fidelity,
Schwab, and Vanguard, 24 which account for three of the top eleven
charities in the United State in terms of contributions received. 25 NSOs

19. See Lila Corwin Berman, Donor Advised Funds in Historical Perspective 13–14, Boston
College Law Forum on Philanthropy and the Public Good, 1 (Oct 2015),
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/pdf/academics/forum_philanthropy/02_Berman.p
df [https://perma.cc/5CGC-HZCH].
20. “Community foundations commonly raise funds and make grants to support numerous
charitable initiatives in their communities, and they hold endowments for local charitable projects in
a number of funds, often including DAFs.” TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
21. In 2015, community foundations are second to national sponsoring organizations in terms of
the percentage of DAF accounts held (25.3%), grants paid (28.5%), contributions collected (24.8%),
and DAF account value (36.5%). NPT 2016 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8–9 (percentages are
calculated from Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10).
22. See SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 8 at 2.
23. See TREASURY REPORT supra note 5, at 51 n.73 (stating that “nearly all, if not all” of their
activity “is administering DAFs”). NSOs are those “that have national reach and whose primary role
is to serve as intermediaries between donors and a broad range of charities.” Id. at 21. The Treasury
Department refers to national sponsors as “NDAFs.” This Article uses the term NSO, in order to
retain a focus on the sponsoring organization.
24. The first commercially sponsored NSO, the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, became a 501(c)(3)
charity with minimal IRS review in 1991, and today is the largest charity in terms of charitable gifts.
See Phillips & O’Leary, supra note 2.
25. Id. In 2015, the Schwab Charitable Fund was fourth, the Vanguard Charitable Endowment
Program was eleventh. See Drew Lindsay, Peter Olsen-Phillips & Eden Stiffman, Fidelity Overtakes
United Way as New Charity Champion, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Fidelity-Overtakes-United-Way/238186
[https://perma.cc/3YPB-22L5].
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with commercial affiliations 26 are poised to succeed. The for-profit firm
provides a pre-established donor base in the form of its existing
customers and also contributes a powerful brand that both reassures
existing customers and attracts new ones. The commercial firm also has
an incentive to assist the related NSO because the affiliated commercial
enterprise typically manages the charitable gift funds (for a fee), and
often bases the compensation of employees of the commercial firm on
total funds under management, including funds owned by the NSO. 27
Thus, the commercial enterprise and its employees stand to benefit from
the NSO’s success. Altogether, NSOs amount to about one-half of the
DAF industry even though they are the fewest in number (4.7%). 28
In addition to community foundations and NSOs, DAFs also are used
by charities that have a single issue or purpose, 29 including universities
and religious organizations. The “single-issue” sponsor is the most
amorphous type of sponsoring organization; it includes a wide range of
501(c)(3) organizations, which, like community foundations, use DAFs
as a supplemental fundraising device. 30 A distinguishing feature of
single-issue sponsoring organizations is that some are “primarily
involved in the direct provision of charitable services.” 31 This means that
in contrast to NSOs, which mainly provide DAFs, and community
foundation sponsors, which are primarily grant-making organizations,
single issue sponsors generally are active charities. Single-issue

26. Some NSOs have a national reach but are not affiliated with financial institutions, for
example, the National Philanthropic Trust. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
27. See Alan M. Cantor, Donor-Advised Funds and the Shifting Charitable Landscape: Why
Congress Must Respond 134 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/
schools/law/pdf/academics/forum_philanthropy/08_Cantor.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD2P-A3SE].
28. NSOs organizations sponsor roughly 57% of all DAFs, make 49% of all grants, collect 57%
of all contributions, and hold nearly 49% of DAF account asset value. NPT 2016 REPORT, supra
note 2, at 8–9 (percentages calculated from Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10).
29. “Some common Single-Issue Charities include universities, Jewish federations, other faithbased charities and issue-specific charities, such as those in the environmental, social justice or
international relief arenas.” NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. A distinguishing feature of
single-issue sponsoring organizations is that some are “primarily involved in the direct provision of
charitable services.” TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 49.
30. According to the National Philanthropic Trust, a single-issue sponsoring organization is: “[a]
tax-exempt organization that works in a specific topic area. Some common Single-Issue Charities
include universities, Jewish federations, other faith-based charities, and issue-specific charities, such
as those in the environmental, social justice or international relief arenas.” NPT 2016 REPORT, supra
note 2, at 2. The Treasury Department does not define the category but lists the issue types in its
cataloging of sponsoring organizations. Issues included are education, health, religious, and other.
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48. The Treasury Department relied on the National
Taxonomy of Exempt Entities classifications.
31. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48.
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sponsoring organizations constitute approximately 36% of sponsoring
organizations, 32 with colleges and universities as the dominant type. 33
C.

Legal Issues, Legislation, and the Policy Debate

The advent of the NSO gave rise to a number of legal issues.
Although DAFs had been around for a long time, an organization with a
genesis in the investment world that did nothing but sponsor DAFs was
a new idea for a tax-exempt charitable organization. As a result, the
NSO and the DAF became subject to considerable scrutiny.
An initial question was whether NSOs could qualify as 501(c)(3)
organizations. Because NSOs administer financial accounts as their main
activity, the charitable purpose was not initially clear.34 Relatedly,
commercially affiliated NSOs raised (and continue to raise) concerns
about benefit to private parties. Under the private benefit doctrine, a
501(c)(3) organization may not be organized for the benefit of a private
interest. 35 Because funds raised by the NSO typically are managed by
the commercial entity that shares the NSO’s name, there is a question
whether the public purpose of raising funds for charity or the private
benefit that flows to the commercial firm is dominant. 36 If the private
benefit is the main reason for the NSO’s existence, then the NSO should
fail as a 501(c)(3) organization.
The extent of a donor’s control over their DAF also caused concern.
As a general rule, in order to claim a charitable deduction, donors may
not retain dominion and control over donated funds but must make a
completed gift. 37 Some of the new DAFs allowed a donor to continue as
a matter of right to direct the investment or distribution of donated

32. Single-issue sponsors sponsor roughly 17.5% of all DAFs, make 23% of all grants, collect
17.8% of all contributions, and hold 14.1% of DAF account asset value. Percentages compiled from
information in NPT 2016 REPORT, supra note 2, at 8–9 (percentages calculated from Figures 7, 8, 9,
and 10).
33. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
34. As discussed in more detail in Part III, a longstanding basis for 501(c)(3) status is to raise
funds for other charitable organizations, a standard NSOs easily satisfy.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2014) (providing that a 501(c)(3)
organization must serve “a public rather than a private interest”).
36. See RON SHOEMAKER, ET AL., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1999, O. DONOR CONTROL (1999); RONALD J. SHOEMAKER & AMY HENCHEY, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE)
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 M. DONOR DIRECTED FUNDS (1996).
37. See SHOEMAKER, supra note 36; SHOEMAKER & HENCHEY, supra note 36;
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funds, calling into question whether a completed gift was made. 38
Further, concerns were raised that DAFs, though similar to private
foundations, were not subject to private foundation rules, such as a
mandatory payout requirement.
A comprehensive discussion of the resolution of these issues (some of
which remain unsettled) is outside the scope of this Article. In short,
during the 1990s, some issues were resolved in litigation, 39 and some
through the exemption application process. 40 In the end, the IRS lost in
court on exempt purpose, private benefit, and control issues, 41 and
eventually yielded to the national sponsoring organization by granting
public charity status to a major NSO—the Vanguard Charitable
Endowment—after extensive review and negotiation. 42

38. Thus, the IRS developed a distinction between a donor “directed” fund and a donor “advised”
fund, with directed funds disfavored because of the control donors retained. Id. The Treasury
Department and the IRS addressed a similar issue in the 1970s in the context of trust funds set up at
community foundations. Concerned that donor control over these funds could undermine the public
charity status of the community foundation, the Treasury Department provided in regulations that if
a donor places a material restriction on the use of donated funds, the fund would be treated as a
private foundation and thus subject to tougher rules. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10). These material
restriction rules did not apply to NSOs, however, because NSOs generally are corporations. At the
time, community foundations objected strongly that the NSO was little more than a way around the
material restriction rules of the regulations, putting community foundations at a competitive
disadvantage. See, e.g., Jack Shakely, Letter to the Editor, Commercial Gift Funds Flout Sprit of the
Law, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 6, 1997, at 38 (stating that the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund
does not “conduct donor education,” “has no program officers whatsoever,” does not perform an
“independent investigation of grantees, assessment of community needs, [or] promulg[ate] grant
guidelines”). Mr. Shakely has since recanted. Jack Shakely, Who’s Afraid of DAFs?, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Summer 2015, at 59.
39. See, e.g., Fund for Anonymous Gifts v. United States, 194 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
National Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486 (1987).
40. The IRS scrutinized exemption applications and signaled in non-precedential guidance that it
would be guided by the material restriction rules in assessing the exempt status of non-community
foundation DAFs. Thus, new DAFs were encouraged to fall on the right side of the donor advice
versus donor direction line. A related issue was whether donor directed funds counted as “publicly
supported” for purposes of the public support test. In addition, the IRS also cited voluntary
compliance with a 5% payout as a positive factor for exempt status. RON SHOEMAKER & BILL
BROCKNER, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001, G. CONTROL AND
POWER: ISSUES INVOLVING SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS, DONOR ADVISED FUNDS, AND
DISQUALIFIED PERSON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 119–21 (2001).
41. The control issues were resolved on the ground that the corporate sponsoring organization, as
a separate and distinct entity, formally had dominion and control over donated funds. So long as the
sponsoring organization has the clear legal right not to follow donor advice, donor advisory
privileges are not a bar to a charitable deduction.
42. Paul Streckfus, Vanguard’s Successful March To (c)(3) Exemption, Public Charity Status: A
Charitable Gift Fund Case Study, 3 EO TAX J. 33–100 (1998).
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Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of years of wrestling with DAFrelated issues generated a Treasury Department budget proposal in 2000
for DAF legislation. 43 The proposal sought uniformity across DAFs and
would have required all DAF sponsors to distribute or pay out 5% of
aggregate fund values each year for exempt purposes. 44 The proposal
also would have restricted the class of eligible DAF grantees to public
charities. 45
The Treasury proposal was not enacted or re-proposed, 46 but concerns
about DAFs remained. In 2005, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson raised
awareness of DAF-related abuses by testifying before the Senate
Finance Committee. 47 The following year, Congress enacted DAF
legislation as part of the Pension Protection Act (“PPA”) amid a broader
package of exempt organization reforms. 48
Following the lead of the Treasury Department’s goal of uniform
ground rules, the PPA DAF legislation applied to any DAF (as defined),
regardless of the type of DAF sponsor. 49 The rules are animated by
43. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 105 (2000).
44. A 5% pay out rule would have put sponsoring organizations under a similar regime to that of
private foundations, which are required to distribute 5% of non-charitable use assets each year for
an exempt purpose. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2012). Under the proposal, for an organization that
sponsored DAFs as its primary activity (meaning over 50% of assets held in DAFs), public charity
status was available only if: there was no material restriction on any one DAF, DAF distributions
could be made only to public charities, and in the aggregate 5% of total DAF assets were paid out
each year. Failure to satisfy any of the three conditions resulted in private foundation treatment for
the sponsoring organization and, therefore, the DAFs under its control. In addition, the proposal
applied to the DAFs of organizations that did not offer DAFs as a primary activity (giving as an
example, a school that operates a DAF). If such a DAF did not satisfy the three conditions, then it
became subject to the private foundation rules, though the public charity status of the sponsor was
not affected. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 43, at 106.
45. Id. at 107.
46. The Treasury proposal coincided with the last year of the Clinton Administration and was not
renewed by the incoming Bush Administration.
47. See Letter from Mark W. Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue, to The Hon. Charles E.
Grassley, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 30, 2005) (describing abuses at donor advised
funds as a top compliance problem: “We have found that certain promoters encourage individuals to
establish purported donor-advised fund arrangements that are used for a taxpayer’s personal benefit,
and some of the charities that sponsor these funds may be complicit in the abuse. The promoters
inappropriately claim that payments to these organizations are deductible . . . . Also, they often
claim that the assets transferred to the funds may grow tax free and later be used to benefit the
donors . . . to reimburse them for their expenses, or to fund their children’s educations.”).
48. For a description of all the rules imposed on DAFs, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 624–
44 (2007). The author was involved in the drafting of the donor advised fund legislation.
49. There is one exception. DAFs held by a private foundation are not subject to the rules. I.R.C.
§ 4966(d)(1)(B) (2012).
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concerns about donor control and the abuse that can result. The main
provision required that distributions by DAFs be to another public
charity; distributions to individuals and private foundations were
restricted. 50 The PPA also required the Treasury Department to report to
Congress on a variety of issues relating to DAFs, including whether
DAFs should be subject to a payout and whether a charitable deduction
was appropriate for DAF gifts given the time lag between date of gift
and distribution of funds. 51
Subsequently, DAFs have remained in the spotlight. Perhaps most
significantly, in 2014, the then-Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, Representative Dave Camp, proposed a five-year payout for
all donor advised fund contributions as part of tax reform. 52 DAF
sponsors oppose the Camp proposal or any mandated payout, and
generally praise the growth of DAFs as a sign of a vibrant charitable
sector. 53 Critics of DAFs contend that DAFs face an inherent conflict of
interest, hoard money, and should be subject to greater regulation. 54
In short, since the rise of the NSO, DAFs have seen incredible growth
and popularity as a charitable giving vehicle, amid many uncertainties
about their role in private philanthropy and concerns about abuse.
Clearly, DAFs would not be successful and growing if donors did not
50. Id. § 4966. For a more detailed discussion of the PPA provisions see supra notes 63–69 and
accompanying text.
51. The subsequent Treasury Department report, released in 2011, takes careful note of the
different types of sponsoring organizations but does not make distinctions among sponsoring
organizations in its recommendations to Congress. In conclusions largely favorable to the status
quo, the report concludes that the favorable deduction rules for DAFs are appropriate because DAFs
are not controlled by the donor (unlike a private foundation). In addition, the Treasury Department
reasoned that although there may be a delay between the timing of the deduction and the delivery of
charitable benefits, this delay also exists at other public charities, which nonetheless benefit from
the favorable rules. The report also concluded that a payout on DAFs would be premature based on
the limited data available. The report did leave open the door to future analysis of pay out trends and
to work with Congress on whether additional regulation or legislation would be necessary. See
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5.
52. See Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014) (introduced by Rep. Dave
Camp).
53. See, e.g., Joanne Florino, An Argument Against Congressional Response (unpublished
manuscript), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=philanth
ropy-forum (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (arguing that DAFs “are democratizing philanthropy and
fostering more strategic and thoughtful giving” and that a pay out is not necessary); Victoria
Bjorklund, The Rise of Donor Advised Funds: Why Congress Should Not Respond, 1 B.C. L. SCH. F.
ON PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 69, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1018&context=philanthropy-forum (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
54. See Lewis B. Cullman & Ray Madoff, The Undermining of American Charity, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (July 14, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/07/14/the-undermining-ofamerican-charity/ [https://perma.cc/9Q23-VCD7]; Cantor, supra note 27, at 134.
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like the product. What is less clear, however, is the role the DAF plays
or should play in the philanthropic ecosystem.
II.

UNTANGLING THE OVERLAPPING VIEWS OF DAFS

Whether to increase the regulation of DAFs is one of the principal
policy issues facing the 501(c)(3) sector. To decide, it is necessary to
consider what DAF contributions and DAFs represent. Are DAFs
attracting money that would have been contributed anyway, but to a
private foundation or to another public charity? Or are DAFs attracting
new charitable contributions that otherwise would have been privately
consumed? Each alternative destination for DAF contributions suggests
a different regulatory approach. Relatedly, DAFs represent different
things to different observers—some view DAFs as private foundation
equivalents, others as something else.
This Part of the Article outlines three different, though not mutually
exclusive, views of DAFs: as quasi-private foundations, as public charity
substitutes, and as catalysts for new charitable giving. Each view
provides insights about the role of DAFs in the philanthropic system and
suggests ways in which DAFs should be regulated.
A.

DAFs as Private Foundation Substitutes

Perhaps the most common way to conceptualize donor advised funds
is by analogy to the private foundation. 55 The comparison is made
because DAFs and private foundations are both grant-making vehicles,
subject to the direction or advice of the donor. In the case of a private
foundation, a donor establishes and controls a separate entity,
contributes funds, and then over time distributes the funds for the
exempt purposes of the foundation. In the case of a DAF, a donor makes
arrangements with a (typically pre-existing) private charity, the
sponsoring organization, to open and administer a separate and distinct
account often in the donor’s name. The donor funds the account and then
gives advice over time about account distributions, consistent with the
donor’s charitable preferences. In this way, private foundations and
DAFs are quite similar.
55. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that “[t]he closest analogue among
private foundations to . . . DAFs are grant-making non-operating foundations”). The DAF is often
coined as the “poor man’s private foundation.” Victoria B. Bjorklund, Charitable Giving to a
Private Foundation and the Alternatives, SC74 ALI-ABA 69, 73 (1998). Private foundations can be
“non-operating” or “operating.” The private foundation referred to in this Article generally is nonoperating, meaning a grant-making organization.
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A key difference between them is the legal control over funds
exercised by donors. With the private foundation, donors and related
parties may and do exercise control of donated funds through control of
the foundation. With DAFs, donors typically do not control the
sponsoring organization and, therefore, may provide only advice to the
sponsoring organization about the distribution of fund assets. 56
Nevertheless, although legal control over funds is vested with the
sponsoring organization, for the DAF to be attractive to donors, there is
a strong expectation that sponsoring organizations will follow donor
advice as a matter of course. 57 If donor advice were not heeded, donors
would quickly grow frustrated and end the relationship. Accordingly,
donor advice is often thought of as a legal fiction. 58 Donors remain in
effective control of the assets and can make grants in a similar manner as
with a private foundation (though grants to individuals are generally not
permitted).
As compared to a private foundation, though, the DAF is a taxadvantaged and less costly alternative. For federal income tax purposes,
the amount allowed the donor as a deduction for many types of noncash
contributions to a DAF sponsoring organization is larger than for
contributions to private foundations. 59 Charitable contributions to DAF

56. See generally id. at 78. When NSOs first emerged, an early question was whether donors
provided “advice” (no legal control) or gave “direction” (legal control). See, e.g., SHOEMAKER &
HENCHEY, supra note 36. If a donor retains control, then the contribution is not viewed as a
completed gift, and no charitable deduction is allowed.
57. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that “[n]o respondent reported ongoing
disagreements with donors over the appropriateness of potential grants, and all respondents said
that, in general, donor advice was followed”).
58. See SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that “[e]vidence suggests . . . that
donors to DAFs have effective control over grants, and to some extent investments, because
sponsoring organizations typically follow the donor’s advice.”); TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5,
at 69 (noting that one respondent thought that DAFs “appear to give DAF donors de facto control
over investment and distribution decisions”). As an illustration of how DAFs are viewed in the field,
Giving USA defines a donor-advised fund as:
An account by which donors may provide charitable gifts. This type of account is facilitated by
community foundations or financial services companies. Donors typically contribute large
amounts in the form of tax-deductible assets to these accounts in order to grow the assets, and
donors usually choose to have significant control over the funds and direct which nonprofits
will be recipients of the gifts.
GIVING USA REPORT FOR 2014, supra note 3, at 263 (emphasis added). The definition is a good
example of the fact that legal formalities aside, in practice donors expect to control fund
distributions.
59. In general, for contributions of appreciated property, the donor may deduct the fair market
value of the property if given to a public charity, but may only deduct the cost basis if to a private
foundation. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (e) (2012). Exceptions apply. See infra Part III for additional
discussion.
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sponsoring organizations also are subject to a higher cap. 60 Further,
private foundations are subject to a tax on investment income, a payout
requirement, a comprehensive self-dealing regime, and limitations on
spending 61—none of which apply to sponsoring organizations (or
DAFs). In addition, donors do not have to set up or administer DAFs and
so are free of compliance burdens. 62
When donors choose a DAF instead of a private foundation, one
regulatory model thus emerges. Viewed as a private foundation
substitute, the question is simply whether the DAF is a loophole, i.e., a
vehicle donors can use to avoid the private foundation regime. If so, then
the issue is whether any or all of the private foundation rules, including
the less favorable deduction rules and a payout, should apply to DAFs.
To date, the view of DAFs as quasi-private foundations has guided
the legislative process. By enacting the PPA legislation in 2006,
Congress determined that the public charity nature of DAF sponsoring
organizations provided insufficient protection against abuse 63 and
applied some of the private foundation rules (or close analogs) to
DAFs. 64 Thus, Congress penalized certain transactions even if at arm’s
length, 65 restricted the types of permissible distributions from DAFs, 66
and directly applied the private foundation limits on the permissible
holdings in any one business. 67 Congress did not, however, require a
payout, 68 impose the harsher charitable deduction rules, or subject DAFs
to a tax on investment income. 69
60. The cap is based on the donor’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 170(b).
61. See id. §§ 4940–45.
62. Private foundations also file a different information return, the Form 990-PF, than public
charities.
63. The path for abuse is straightforward. A donor takes a deduction for a DAF contribution, and
then advises out a grant that directly or indirectly benefits the donor. Unless a sponsoring
organization is very active in supervising grants, this type of abuse would be fairly easy. This is the
reason DAFs generally may not make grants to individuals, but are limited to public charities.
64. Congress implicitly copied the private foundation approach. For additional discussion, see
Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FL. TAX REV. 1, 60–63
(2011). Congress did not distinguish among sponsoring organizations but focused on the DAF qua
DAF.
65. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2) (2012) (prohibiting most transactions between a DAF and a donoradvisor or related party (e.g., sales, loans, compensation) even if at arm’s length).
66. Id. §§ 4966–67 (subjecting DAF grants to individuals and grants for a noncharitable purpose
to an excise tax).
67. Id. § 4943(e).
68. A payout was enacted in the Senate but did not survive final passage. The Tax Relief Act of
2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 331 (2005) (as passed by the Senate November 18).
69. For a description of all the rules imposed on DAFs, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM., supra note
48, at 624–44.
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The more DAFs are understood as private foundations, the more they
resemble a loophole, and the stronger the logic for applying additional
parts of the private foundation regime to DAFs. 70 Thus, one continuing
thread of the policy debate is whether Congress should continue on the
current path and apply more of the private foundation rules to DAFs and
DAF sponsoring organizations.
B.

DAFs as Public Charity Substitutes

Donor advised funds are also viewed as substitutes for other public
charities. Under this view, DAFs offer the functionality of a private
foundation but are funded with money that otherwise would have gone
to another public charity. 71 For example, without a DAF, a donor would
have given to a human services organization, the donor’s alma mater, an
art museum, or some other operating charity. When the donor instead
contributes to a DAF, the DAF has altered the distribution of charitable
funds. In a zero-sum game, 72 the success of DAFs comes at the expense
of other public charities, deferring the date when operating charities can
benefit from funds.
The substitution effect is plainest with respect to contributions to
NSOs. There is no reason to give to an NSO but for the DAF. Thus,
assuming a gift is a substitute, if not for the NSO, the gift would still be
made, another public charity would benefit, and the donor would get the
same tax benefit.
Substitution may occur at DAFs sponsored by other charities, but to a
lesser extent. For example, if a donor creates a DAF at his alma mater,
the same gift might have gone to the alma mater even without the DAF,
so there is no substitution. Either way, the university receives the gift.
The DAF in this context is merely an additional fundraising tool for the
university.
Contributions to DAFs at community foundations present additional
considerations. Community foundation DAFs may be substitutes for
private foundations or other public charities, or, because community
70. This was the initial approach of the Treasury Department, which in 2000 proposed regulating
sponsoring organizations and DAFs (at the account level) as private foundations. See DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 43, at 105.
71. In general, the tax law divides section 501(c)(3) organizations into two broad categories:
private foundation and public charity. The default characterization is a private foundation.
Organizations avoid foundation status either based on their principle function (e.g., as a church,
school, or hospital) or by reason of their public support. See I.R.C. § 509.
72. For illustrative purposes here, a zero-sum game is assumed. The assumption of a non-zerosum game is discussed next.
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foundations offer a unique form of community support, the community
foundation DAFs might be more like a university, with no substitution.
In any event, the substitution effect plainly occurs at the NSO. In
order to assess whether a substitution effect is beneficial, the nature of
the DAF and the NSO must be closely considered.
If NSOs perform just like other public charities, then the federal tax
issues raised by substitution are nothing new. The shift in charitable
giving from one public charity to another would simply reflect a healthy
competition. For example, if a new art museum is so successful that it
attracts charitable gifts away from other art museums, the public still
gets art (supported by the same donors), albeit in a different location and
form.
A slightly different case arises if the new art museum attracts
contributions that normally would have gone to the soup kitchen. Now,
the success of art comes at the cost of serving the needy. This may be of
concern (the competition now is perhaps less healthy), but noninterference with the substantive preferences of donors is an endemic
policy of the charitable deduction, which largely avoids making value
judgments about exempt purposes. 73
NSOs, though, are not like other public charities. NSOs do not have
an independent substantive charitable purpose or goal. NSOs are not
formed to relieve poverty, eliminate malaria, improve education, foster
community development, or achieve other concrete public ends. 74
Rather, NSOs essentially are fundraising organizations. The NSO
principally collects funds, retains financial advice, and performs the
administrative function of ensuring that the recipient suggested by the
donor-advisor is on the IRS’s list of eligible public charities. 75
73. The charitable deduction is generally value-neutral, based on the purposes of the organization.
Value judgments are reflected in the purposes chosen—charitable, educational, scientific, religious,
literary—but apart from that, the IRS mostly assesses means, not ends. Whether the charitable
deduction should remain value neutral is a different debate outside the scope of this Article.
74. As Fidelity puts it: “The mission of the organization is to further the American tradition of
philanthropy by providing programs that make charitable giving simple and effective.” FIDELITY
CHARITABLE, 2015 Giving Report: A Deeper Look at Fidelity Charitable Donors and the Many
Ways They Give 26 (2015) [hereinafter FIDELITY 2015 REPORT]. In its 2016 report, Fidelity added
“accessible” to the mission. FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 2.
75. For example, as described by Fidelity: “Before making a grant, Fidelity Charitable conducts
due diligence on recommendations to assure the funds will be used for charitable purposes.”
FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 4. The due diligence referred to is checking the donor’s
suggested charity against the IRS list of qualified organizations. Noncharitable status would be the
main basis for a sponsoring organization to reject a donor’s advice. If a donor advises a grant to a
bona fide public charity, and the sponsoring organization is unaware of any benefits flowing to the
donor because of the contribution, then sponsoring organizations would be hard pressed (even
though legally entitled) to reject donor advice. A sponsoring organization also might exercise due
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Viewed as a fundraising organization and public charity substitute,
the delay in distributions caused by DAFs at NSOs is problematic.76
Without the NSO, the charitable funds would have gone immediately to
an active charitable use.77 With the NSO, the funds await the advice of a
donor, which may be long in coming. The DAF here is little more than
an intermediary, delaying the time at which the ultimate beneficiary
receives control of the funds. A gift to the NSO represents charity,
deferred.
Further, donors to NSOs are encouraged, implicitly or not, to defer
charitable distributions, which makes the problem worse. For example,
consider a hypothetical (but likely typical) contribution by a donor to the
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund. 78 The donor already has funds invested
with Fidelity on a private, commercial basis. As the end of the year
approaches, the donor receives charitable solicitations from a number of
local charities but, as in prior years, has trouble deciding which ones to
support and in what amount. Coincidentally, the donor then also receives
a solicitation from Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund. The solicitation
promises an immediate charitable deduction and tells the donor that he
or she can advise at any time in the future about the eventual 501(c)(3)
recipient.
diligence and not make a grant if there were indications that the funds were to be used for
noncharitable purposes, such as lobbying or political campaign activity.
76. There is a technical argument that DAF contributions do not result in a delay to a charity in
receiving benefits. The argument would be that because a sponsoring organization is a bona-fide
public charity, there is no delay because the funds have been contributed to charity. An analogy
could also be drawn to funds contributed to any charity where the funds are not spent immediately,
but accumulated by the charity for future use. In such (common) cases, there clearly is a delay or
gap between the time of the deduction and the ultimate use of the funds for charitable beneficiaries.
As discussed in Part III, NSOs, though public charities, are distinct from other organizations in that
spending funds for the benefit of other charities is their main activity. Fidelity implicitly
acknowledges this point in its marketing materials using the language quoted supra: “Before
making a grant, Fidelity Charitable conducts due diligence on recommendations to assure the funds
will be used for charitable purposes.” FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added).
Note the implicit acknowledgement that DAF funds are held for future charitable use, i.e., the fact
that the funds already have been contributed to charity does not denote a current charitable use,
notwithstanding the argument that NSOs are independent public charities. See FIDELITY
CHARITABLE, POLICY GUIDELINES: PROGRAM CIRCULAR (2016), http://www.fidelity
charitable.org/docs/Gift-Fund-Policy-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2CW-SVDL].
77. It might be rebutted that if the gift went to a university, for example, instead of an NSO, the
university (or other charity) might put the funds into its endowment, or otherwise decide not to put
the funds to “an active charitable use.” This objection misses the point, however. The key
consideration is that the university (or other charity) has ownership of the funds. The university
might accumulate funds excessively, but this is a different issue—at least the university has the
funds. With an NSO, the funds are parked in a way station, not earmarked for any charity or cause.
78. The Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund is chosen by reference here because it is the largest
sponsoring organization of DAFs in the United States. See Phillips & O’Leary, supra note 1.
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Given the donor’s indecision about which charities to support, the
offer is well-timed, and the donor establishes a DAF with Fidelity. The
donor has made a deductible charitable contribution, and because the
donor has legally parted with the funds, may feel the “warm glow” often
associated with charitable giving. The arrangement also suits Fidelity
because the funds remain under management by the for-profit side of
Fidelity, thereby continuing to earn management fees. 79 Thus, there is an
inherent conflict of interest between the NSO’s mission (to facilitate
charitable distributions) and the mission of the for-profit enterprise (to
keep funds under management).
After the initial deferral, the donor may even reconsider how to give
in the future. Before the DAF, the donor might have made contributions
to a variety of public charities in small amounts each year. But now that
the donor’s annual giving may accumulate in a DAF, the donor starts to
think about giving differently—less as making current contributions and
more as saving for the future. For example, the donor might decide to
accumulate assets in order to build up a sufficient sum so as to advise
distributions of just the income each year, or to involve the donor’s
children in grant-making. Such a shift in attitude toward giving likely is
reinforced by the fact that many sponsoring organizations have relatively
high contribution thresholds of several thousand dollars for initial gifts.80
For the donor, this reinforces the idea that money set aside in a DAF is
more of an investment than a spending transaction.
Relatedly, donors may become possessive of their DAF. The donor
knows that the money formally is out of her legal control, but this is not
transparent. The funds, prior to contribution, were held and managed by
Fidelity in a mutual fund in her name. After the contribution, the funds
are held and managed by Fidelity in a mutual fund in her name. The

79. Arguably, the federal government is disadvantaged by the transaction. If the donation is
$10,000 and the donor is in the 35% tax bracket, then the government supports the transaction by
foregoing $3500 in revenue. But the payoff to the government does not occur until the donor
advises that the money be distributed from the DAF. However, if the deduction were delayed until
distribution, it does not necessarily follow that the government is better off. If the asset is noncash,
the donor might be worse off using a DAF. See John R. Brooks, The Missing Tax Benefit of DonorAdvised Funds, 150 TAX NOTES 1013 (2016) (arguing that because unrealized gains are not taxed,
donors generally would be better off holding onto an appreciated asset, giving later, and getting a
larger deduction). Professor Brooks’ argument carries more weight with respect to highly liquid
property than illiquid, which is often sold promptly upon donation. See discussion infra Part IV.
80. For example, the minimum amount to start a DAF at Fidelity or Schwab is $5000. See What it
Costs, FIDELITY CHARITABLE, https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-account/what-it-costs.
shtml [https://perma.cc/DNP8-YNFV]; Schwab Charitable, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.
schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/accounts_products/accounts/trust_estate/donor_advised_fund
[https://perma.cc/8L6U-B8VX].

05 - Colinvaux.docx (Do Not Delete)

58

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/21/2017 2:42 PM

[Vol. 92:39

funds may even be in a similar mutual fund as before the contribution.81
The donor knows Fidelity is unlikely to distribute money from her DAF
without her advice. She receives quarterly statements showing
investment gains in her account.
Taken altogether, from the donor’s perspective, the money in the
DAF still feels like it is “hers,” subject to her will. As additional
reinforcement, sponsoring organizations honor advisory privileges
across generations, 82 meaning that the ability to advise becomes a kind
of asset that the donor can pass on to her heirs outside the property
system, but only if the donor does not spend the money. The DAF has
converted a donor from a charitable spender on current needs to a
charitable saver for future needs.
In sum, viewed as public charity substitutes, contributions to NSOs
represent a delay to charity, pure and simple. Instead of receiving a
contribution in year one, the art museum receives a contribution in year
two, or year three, four, five, or never. True, a contribution received later
might be larger due to investment gains, 83 but if the contribution was
made in year one, the donee then could also have reaped those gains, and
more importantly, would have had discretion about how best to use the
funds, discretion that is deferred by the DAF intermediary. 84
The delay in charitable distributions caused by DAFs at NSOs could
be addressed broadly in one of two ways. One is to mandate an
aggressive payout, far in excess of the private foundation payout, to
minimize the extent of the delay. Another would be to delay the
charitable deduction for contributions to sponsoring organizations to
match the distribution from the donor advised fund. Both approaches are
discussed in more detail in Part III.

81. “At Fidelity Charitable, donors can recommend an investment strategy that aligns with their
goals and giving time horizons through Fidelity Charitable’s investment pools or investment
advisor-managed accounts.” FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note 74, at 3.
82. As reported by the Treasury Department: “A sponsoring organization . . . may allow a donor
to appoint a successor advisor for the DAF, e.g., a spouse, child, or other descendant, who would
continue to make recommendations regarding distributions from the account.” TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 5, at 22.
83. The contribution also could be smaller due to investment losses.
84. It is often noted that DAFs increase charitable giving through investment growth. Fidelity
incorporates asset growth as part of its giving philosophy, “Give, Grow, Grant,” and says that
“[i]nvestment growth has generated $3.6 billion in additional charitable dollars.” FIDELITY 2015
REPORT, supra note 74, at 12. Asset growth also is viewed not “as capital denied to charity [but]
instead can be understood as a major philanthropic capital reserve fund . . . .” HOWARD HUSOCK,
GROWING GIVING: AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY AND THE POTENTIAL OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS 7
(2015).
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DAFs as Vehicles for New Giving

Another way to view DAFs is as vehicles that spur new charitable
giving. Here, DAFs are not diverting contributions from one part of the
charitable sector to another. Rather, DAFs are the reason donors give.
For example, an investor with Schwab may have never made
charitable contributions before. But after hearing his friends and
colleagues talk about their DAFs, he decides to open an account—either
from peer pressure or just because the DAF appeals to his giving matrix
in a way that other charities never did.
DAFs could also encourage supplemental giving. For instance, a
donor who regularly gives 2% of her income each year to active public
charities decides upon creating a DAF to add DAF contributions to her
giving profile, increasing overall giving to 2.5% of her income each
year.
In addition, donor advised funds likely attract new charitable gifts
when donors have a financial windfall, e.g., through inheritance or a
bonus. 85 In such cases, a DAF offers a convenient way to make a large
charitable gift before the donor digests the windfall into her personal
portfolio (becoming possessive of it) and without having to select
beneficiaries right away, a burden that might otherwise have thwarted
the gift.
Also, as discussed in Part IV, DAFs increasingly are used for
contributions of complex assets, which other public charities might not
accept and are not tax-preferred if given to a private foundation. Gifts of
complex assets could represent new giving, but only to the extent that
donors do not reduce other giving to compensate, which many donors
likely would. 86
As a possible source of new contributions, one response is to adopt a
celebratory tone and advocate a hands-off regulatory approach. After all,
if regulation undermines the fundamental appeal of DAFs for donors, the
risk is that DAFs as a catalyst for charitable giving would be eliminated,
which would be counterproductive. Further, why regulate at all? Just
because the DAF is a bountiful vehicle should not mean that regulation
must follow—like a moth to a flame.

85. Fidelity reports that 27% and more than one-third of high net worth donors use donor advised
funds to absorb financial windfalls. FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22.
86. In other words, gifts of complex assets through DAFs are substitutes for other gifts.
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As a practical matter, however, it is highly unlikely that most DAF
contributions to NSOs ($12.77 billion in 2015) 87 are new giving. People
give from a sense of generosity, a desire to help others, from deeply held
beliefs, or from duty. 88 Certainly, in the margins, DAFs might generate
new gifts for the reasons suggested, but the core desire to give is based
on human nature, not the abstract features of a financial product. It is
telling that individual giving as a percentage of disposable personal
income has been largely fixed at 2% over a forty-year period. 89
Regardless, even making the unrealistic assumption that all DAF
contributions are gifts that donors would not otherwise make, the federal
government still has an interest in ensuring that DAFs work for the
charitable sector as a whole, and not just in preventing their abuse. The
next two parts of this Article focus on the question of the appropriate
regulatory response to DAFs, taking into account the multiple ways
DAFs are used and the different types of DAF sponsors.
III. A PAYOUT FOR DAFS AT NATIONAL SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS
The use of DAFs cannot be ignored. When five out of eleven of the
most successful charitable fundraisers are DAF sponsors, 90 and a main
result is that charitable distributions are deferred, regulators must pay
attention. The challenge, as the first two parts of this Article have
87. NPT 2016 REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. This is an increase of 3.11 billion dollars from 2014.
NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
88. See Lise Vesterlund, Why Do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, 568–90 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006); René Bekkers &
Pamala Wiepking, Generosity and Philanthropy: A Literature Review 20 (Oct. 28, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015507 [https://
perma.cc/8W7C-H8KP] (surveying the literature on giving and listing eight factors explaining why
people give as “(1) awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4) altruism; (5)
reputation; (6) psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy”).
89. According to Giving USA, in both 1975 and 2015, individual giving as a percentage of
disposable personal income (DPI) was 2%. GIVING USA REPORT FOR 2015, supra note 3, at 327. In
the intervening years, the percentage fluctuated slightly above and below 2%, going as low as 1.7%
(1995) and as high as 2.4% (2000). Id. This suggests that individuals in the aggregate give about 2%
of DPI to charity, regardless of the giving vehicle. This is one indicator that DAFs primarily are
substitutes and without them about the same amount of giving would occur. A different “2%”
number—giving as a percentage of gross domestic product—is sometimes also used to assess
whether giving levels change or remain constant over time. Giving USA also calculates this
percentage (1.7% in 1975 and 2.1% in 2015). Id. at 326. But this percentage is less useful than
individual giving as a percentage of DPI because it uses “total giving” in the numerator. Total
giving is not the same as new giving by individuals, but includes giving already counted as well as
corporate giving.
90. See Phillips & O’Leary, supra note 2.
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shown, is to put the DAF within an analytical framework so that any
regulatory response makes sense.
When considering regulation, it is important to recognize that a DAF
is an activity of an organization, not an entity. So even though it is
common to focus on the DAF, rules relating to DAFs apply to the
sponsoring organization that administers the DAF. The sponsor, not the
DAF, is granted 501(c)(3) status based on its purposes and operations.
Yet not all sponsoring organizations are the same. When the DAF is
part of a charity that has other goals, as with a community foundation or
single-issue charity, the DAF is not an end in itself but an activity used
in furtherance of those goals. As a general matter, donors to these DAF
sponsors are attracted to the underlying mission of the sponsor,
contributions are earmarked for a particular cause or charity, and the
advice offered by donors should fit within the mission of the underlying
charity. This was the historic model for the DAF.
The NSO, though, is a different type of sponsoring organization. A
DAF at an NSO does not further any concrete charitable purpose nor
does it benefit any active charity (until distribution). When NSOs create
a substitution effect, the positive benefit of DAFs is questionable.
A first step in devising a regulatory approach to DAFs is to recognize
that the NSO is a distinct type of charity, and so warrants a distinct
response. The legal and policy challenge is to start from first principles.
How should NSOs be regulated? What is the appropriate role of the
NSO in the philanthropic system? What are NSOs good at? What are
NSOs good for? This part of the Article characterizes the national
sponsoring organization as a fundraising organization that meets its
charitable objective through spending and argues that a payout for DAFs
sponsored by NSOs is appropriate. 91
A.

Exempt Purpose of NSOs

The initial question is why NSOs qualify as public charities. The NSO
primarily collects, invests, and distributes charitable contributions. As
explained by the Treasury Department:
The main characteristic of [NSOs] is that the sponsorship of the
DAFs and other similar accounts or funds generally appears to
constitute the principal activity performed by the sponsoring
organization. The organizations largely focus on receiving
contributions, converting non-cash donations into a more liquid
91. The transition in this Part to focus on the national sponsoring organization does not absolve
other DAF sponsors from concern.
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form, facilitating grant-making, and managing the investment of
DAF assets, rather than the direct provision of charitable
services. 92
As organizations “whose primary role is to serve as intermediaries
between donors and a broad range of charities,” 93 NSOs do not perform
a hands-on advisory role. 94 Although NSOs may provide donors with
general information and resources about 501(c)(3) organizations, the
NSO exists to manage donor accounts and distribute their donations not
to consult with donors.
As an intermediary or conduit between donor and other 501(c)(3)
organizations, NSOs in effect are no more than fundraising
organizations. The exempt status of the fundraising organization is
derived from a 1967 IRS Revenue Ruling in which the IRS held that an
organization “formed for the purpose of providing financial assistance to
several different types of [501(c)(3)] organizations” was itself a
501(c)(3) organization. 95 The organization in the ruling carried “on no
operations other than to receive contributions and incidental investment
income and to make distributions of income to such exempt
organizations at periodic intervals.” 96 Under this line of legal authority,
the plain basis for 501(c)(3) status for the NSO is that it “receive[s]
contributions” and “make[s] distributions” to other organizations for
charitable purposes. 97
Notably a failure to make sufficient distributions would mean that the
organization fails the operational test for exempt status. If, for example,
an organization received one million dollars a year, but only paid out
100 dollars a year to charity, the question would arise whether the
organization would be recognized as a 501(c)(3). The organization
would remain “organized” for an exempt purpose—to receive
contributions and pay out to charity. But if the payout is negligible, then

92. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, at 49.
93. Id. at 21.
94. When a donor advises a distribution, the NSO checks that the proposed recipient is eligible
(information that is publicly available) and then makes the distribution. Rejection of donor advice is
rare. For example, as reported by the Treasury Department: “No [DAF sponsor] reported ongoing
disagreements with donors over the appropriateness of potential grants, and all respondents said
that, in general, donor advice was followed.” Id. at 69.
95. Rev. Rul. 67-149, 1967-1 C.B. 133. The ruling in turn is derived from a 1924 Supreme Court
decision, Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
96. Rev. Rul. 67-149, 1967-1 C.B. 133.
97. Id. There are peripheral grounds for exemption—such as education of donors about
philanthropy, but national sponsoring organizations are not educational organizations.
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the organization would not be “operated” primarily for an exempt
purpose.
In practice, the IRS has conditioned the exempt status of fundraising
organizations on whether the organization pays out commensurate with
its financial resources, also known as the “commensurate in scope
test”. 98 Under this test, it is not enough for an organization to say it will
pay money to charity (when that is the organization’s only purpose); it
must also make sufficient distributions. 99 The commensurate in scope
test has led to considerable confusion because it is not clear when it

98. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, M. SPECIAL
EMPHASIS PROGRAM—CHARITABLE FUND-RAISING (1989), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicm89.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZJ2-XUYE] [hereinafter IRS FISCAL YEAR 1989]. The
commensurate in scope test began as a tool to determine an organization’s primary purpose in cases
where the activity of the organization is commercial in nature and not inherently charitable. The test
is a variation on the destination of income doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in 1924 in the
case of Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores. 263 U.S. 578 (1924). Under the destination of
income test for exemption, what matters is not whether an organization’s activities are charitable,
but the destination of the income from the activities. Congress responded to the destination of
income test in 1950 by enacting a rule barring exempt status for feeder corporations (for profit
organizations that turn over all the profits to charity), I.R.C. § 502 (2012), and by creating the
unrelated business income tax, id. §§ 511–14. Destination of income as a basis for exempt status
mostly remained intact, except in cases where the primary purpose of the organization is for-profit
trade or business activity. For discussion of the commensurate in scope test, see Jack Siegel,
Commensurate in Scope: Myth, Mystery, or Ghost?—Part One, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 26 (2008).
See also John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 487, 514 (2002) (discussing the commerciality doctrine and the commensurate in scope
test); Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled
Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2487 (2005) (noting that the role of the commensurate
in scope doctrine “appears to be to permit decision makers to approve of charitable status for
commercial charities that have appealing missions and that spend most of their commercially raised
funds on their charitable purposes”).
99. The IRS first articulated the commensurate in scope test in a 1964 Revenue Ruling. Rev. Rul.
64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. This Ruling concerned an organization that owned and operated a
commercial office building. The principal source of income for the organization was rent from the
building. Id. Rent is passive income exempt from the unrelated business income tax. If the activity
was subject to UBIT, then the organization would have failed 501(c)(3) status as a feeder
corporation. Because the activity was exempt from UBIT, but the activity was still commercial in
nature, the question arose whether a non-feeder fundraising organization could qualify. The
organization paid the rent it collected from commercial tenants to section 501(c)(3) organizations.
As described by the IRS, “[t]he charitable purposes of the corporation are carried out by aiding
other charitable organizations, selected in the discretion of its governing body, through
contributions and grants to such organizations for charitable purposes.” Id. The organization would
be entitled to exemption “where it is shown to be carrying on through such contributions and grants
a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial resources.” Id. Translation: the
fundraising purpose of the organization is sufficient, but exemption is contingent on whether the
organization spends enough.
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applies, 100 nor is it clear what the test requires when it does apply. As the
IRS has said on numerous occasions: “[t]he ‘commensurate test’ does
not lend itself to rigid numerical distribution formulas—there is no fixed
percentage of income that an organization must pay out for charitable
purposes.” 101 Rather, “the particular facts and circumstances of the fundraising organization must be considered.” 102
Regardless, the important point in the context of NSOs is that the
commensurate in scope test has been consistently applied to assess the
exempt status of fundraising organizations. 103 In other words, as
fundraising organizations, NSOs are already subject to a payout
requirement, albeit an uncertain one.104
In addition, when considering the NSO as a fundraising organization,
it is important to recognize that its case for 501(c)(3) status is
qualitatively weak. Notwithstanding that the fundraising rationale for
exempt status is longstanding, the 501(c)(3) fundraising organization
stands at the edge of legitimacy. Charity is accomplished in the doing.

100. In 2007 and 2008, the specter of the commensurate in scope test was raised in connection
with university endowments. See Jack Siegel, Commensurate in Scope: Myth, Mystery, or Ghost?—
Part Two, 20 TAX’N OF EXEMPTS 8 (2009) (citing Letter from Senators Max Baucus and Charles
Grassley to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson (May 29, 2007) ( suggesting the Treasury and
IRS should “put more teeth” into the commensurate in scope test)).
101. IRS FISCAL YEAR 1989, supra note 98, at 13.
102. Id. at 13–14.
103. Id. at 13 (“Whether a fund-raising organization’s activity may be said to accomplish exempt
purposes often centers on the issue of whether there has been a sufficient turnover of funds to
charity. This issue is resolved through use of the ‘commensurate test’ . . . .”); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986, G. UPDATE ON FUNDRAISING 3 (1986) (noting that
the commensurate in scope test “remains the basis by which such fundraisers are tested. If this test
is met, exemption will not be foreclosed to an organization notwithstanding that its primary
fundraising activity in carrying out its purposes is not inherently charitable or is an unrelated trade
or business.”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, L. FUNDRAISING
48 (1982) (“The commensurate test has been used as the dominant rationale for fund raising event
exemption cases in recent years”, but has been applied “with confusion and inconsistency.”).
104. The fact that NSOs must pay out funds as a component of their 501(c)(3) status is not widely
understood but should be self-evident. If an NSO paid out no money to 501(c)(3) organizations (and
had no plan to do so), the sponsoring organization should lose exempt status by failing the
commensurate in scope test. As the IRS has said: “an organization that raises funds for charitable
purposes but consistently uses virtually all its income for administrative and promotional expenses
with little or no distribution to charity cannot reasonably argue that its distributions are
commensurate with its financial resources and capabilities.” See IRS FISCAL YEAR 1989, supra note
98, at 14.
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To grant “charitable” status 105 to a shell seems awkward and
counterintuitive.
As a result, in order to achieve 501(c)(3) status as a fundraiser, the
formalities are important. If an organization raises and distributes money
for specific charities by contract the organization, though arguably
serving an exempt purpose, does not qualify as a 501(c)(3). For example,
in one IRS ruling, even though an organization’s “activities consist[ed]
entirely of providing fundraising services to organizations[,]” exempt
status failed because the services were a commercial fee-for-service
activity and the organization did not retain control of the funds. 106 The
distinction with an NSO is clear because NSOs do not have contractual
relationships to collect money for specific charities. Even so, both the
NSO and the organization in the ruling perform essentially the same
function—fundraising for charity. 107 Section 501(c)(3) status turns on
legal formalism.
Fundraising organizations face an additional hurdle in attaining
exempt status, namely acute concerns about private inurement and
private benefit. For an organization to qualify as a 501(c)(3), it must not
inure to the benefit of organization insiders, 108 and must serve “a public
rather than a private interest.” 109 In the fundraising context, it is not
uncommon for the putative 501(c)(3) organization to have pre-existing
relationships with for-profit companies that benefit from the fundraising
activity. 110 Thus, the IRS has concluded that even if a charity benefits
from the fundraising, the fundraising organization is not exempt because
of the private benefit that flows to a related entity. 111
105. Contributions to any 501(c)(3) organization technically are “charitable” contributions. I.R.C.
§ 170(c) (2012).
106. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201438029 (May 14, 2014) (concluding that “[y]our fundraising
services do not constitute the provision of grants to charities, rather they are services that are bought
by the charities”).
107. At bottom, the fees collected by the sponsoring organization come from the same source as
the organization in the ruling—out of donor contributions.
108. The Code requires that for an organization to qualify as a 501(c)(3), “no part of the net
earnings [may] inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .” I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3).
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2014). The regulation further provides:
“it is necessary for an organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of
private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the
organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”
110. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990, K. FUNDRAISING
UPDATE 12 (1999).
111. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201438029 (May 14, 2014) (concluding that in addition to not
having an exempt purpose, the organization provided a substantial private benefit because the
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To summarize the legal hurdles facing fundraising organizations:
If the ‘commensurate test’ is met, an organization may qualify
for exempt status under IRC 501(c)(3) notwithstanding the fact
that the fund-raising activity itself is not inherently charitable or
is an unrelated trade or business. However, even if an
organization makes a real and substantial contribution to charity
commensurate with its financial resources, a substantial private
purpose may still be found that will disqualify it from IRC
501(c)(3) exemption. 112
The comparison to national sponsoring organizations is acute. Private
benefit concerns have long dogged NSOs. 113 As described in Part I, the
commercially sponsored NSO may formally be an independent
organization, but nevertheless it has an existential relationship with a
for-profit investment firm, which precedes the charity in every case. The
for-profit arms of Fidelity, Vanguard, Schwab, and other commercial
investment firms that sponsor DAFs all benefit from the fees earned by
DAF accounts. Further, there is an inherent tension, if not a conflict of
interest, between the mission of the NSO (to distribute funds) and the
mission of the for-profit (to hold and invest funds). 114 And, as discussed
in Part IV, as the solicitation and liquidation of complex assets becomes

organization was founded by a for-profit company, four of its six directors are related through their
work with the company, the organization licensed a product owned by the company, and had a
management agreement with the company whereby the organization paid the company $25,000 a
month plus 2% of all of the donations).
112. See IRS FISCAL YEAR 1989, supra note 98, at 14–15.
113. Private benefit concerns were rife at the time sponsoring organizations were seeking
exemption, though eventually turned out not to be a bar. See SHOEMAKER supra note 36;
SHOEMAKER & HENCHEY supra note 36; Albert R. Rodriguez, The Tax-Exempt Status of
Commercially Sponsored Donor-Advised Funds, 17 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 95 (1997). The issue
though continues to simmer. Relatedly, the Treasury released private benefit regulations, which
could affect the calculation going forward. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2014).
The IRS has applied the regulations to disqualify organizations “where a charity was essentially
required to use the services of a particular commercial entity, even where the fees charged
represented fair market value.” See Paul Streckfus, Commercial DAFs and Private Benefit, EO TAX
JOURNAL 2015-164 (comments of Marcus Owens). Owens notes that one possible issue is:
[W]hether ‘commercial DAFs,’ e.g., DAFs formed and managed by commercial investment
businesses, are incompatible with notions of private benefit as set forth in the 2008 private
benefit regulations (and the private benefit court decisions). Will we ever see, for example,
Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund turning to Vanguard or Schwab for investment and sales
management? Will Schwab or Vanguard sales representatives ever recommend Fidelity
Charitable Gift funds to clients?
But see HUSOCK, supra note 84, at 6 (“Ultimately, the debate over DAFs is one not about fees that
may flow to private financial firms but about whether the U.S. wants to encourage growth in
charitable giving as a portion of the economy.”).
114. See supra Part I.
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the primary activity of NSOs, the NSO increasingly resembles a
commercial undertaking.
All that said, NSOs indubitably are recognized as 501(c)(3) public
charities. Whatever private benefit exists in current arrangements would
at this stage appear unlikely to jeopardize exempt status (if only because
the arrangements are well established, the stakes are high, and the IRS is
timid). It also is unlikely that the IRS would challenge exempt status
based on the commensurate in scope test.115 Nevertheless, even though
the public charity status of NSOs has been established, the case for
exempt status is weak. As a fundraising organization, the NSO qualifies
on the basest of grounds—paying out to others—and amidst concerns
about private benefit.
B.

A Fund-Based Payout in Fulfillment of Exempt Purpose

Several factors point to adoption of a rule that specifies the rate of
distribution from DAFs at NSOs. These include the fact that fundraising
organizations already are required to pay out funds, the relatively weak
case for exempt status, and the fact that not all NSO contributions
represent new giving, but come at a cost to active public charities.
As a fundraising organization, the 501(c)(3) mission of the NSO and
the basis for its exempt status is to collect and distribute money. The
principal issue is the appropriate rate of distribution. The IRS through
regulations, or, if the IRS does not act, Congress through legislation,
should apply the commensurate in scope test with a bright line. Under a
bright line test, NSOs should be required to ensure that each DAF under
their control pays out contributions (measured annually) within a range
of five to ten years. 116 Whatever number is settled on (be it a five-year
payout or ten), what matters is that the payout is set so that it is long
enough that the appeal of DAFs for donors that would not otherwise give
is not undermined, but is not so long that the delay in distributions that
results when donors use DAFs as public charity substitutes is not
excessive. In other words, the ideal spending period would be one that

115. The IRS could argue that the commensurate test requires a sponsoring organization to have
in place a policy that each DAF account spend commensurate with its resources.
116. In theory, the payout rate could be as high as 100%, on the view that, notwithstanding that
formal legal control is vested in the sponsoring organization, NSOs are essentially conduits, and as
substitutes for gifts to other public charities, the distribution should be delayed no longer than
necessary. Although a 100% payout may sound extreme, a similar payout is used to permit conduit
foundations to be eligible for the 50% limitation. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012); id.
§ 170(b)(1)(F)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(h) (as amended in 2011) (“[p]rivate nonoperating
foundation distributing amount equal to all contributions received”).
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does not deter too many new donors while limiting the net detriment to
charity that occurs when DAFs are used as public charity substitutes. To
the extent that DAF contributions are in lieu of private foundation
contributions, there is no issue except that these donors may opt for a
private foundation instead of a DAF in search of a lower payout (but
more control).
One objection to a payout is that it is unnecessary. Many NSOs claim
to already pay out at high levels and so argue that a payout is redundant.
For example, the Schwab Charitable Fund reports that on average their
DAFs distribute 20% a year, well in excess of the private foundation 5%
payout requirement. 117 Fidelity says that since it started operations in
1991, 61% of contributions have been distributed and that a majority of
contributions are distributed within a decade. 118 For NSOs as a whole,
the National Philanthropic Trust reports an aggregate payout rate of
21.4%. 119
These payout levels, though generally robust, are largely beside the
point. The payouts reported by sponsoring organizations are at the
aggregate level, not the fund level, thus the numbers do not really reveal
very much. Some individual funds pay out at very high levels—as high
as 100%. 120 High payouts by some funds mean that many funds held by
the same sponsoring organization pay well below the mean. 121 Assume
for example that a sponsoring organization holds 1,000 DAFs, and each
DAF has an asset value at the beginning of the year of $10,000. If 200
DAFs paid out $10,000 (a 100% rate) and the remaining 800 DAFs paid

117. Annual Giving Report 2015, SCHWAB CHARITABLE (2015), http://www.schwab
charitable.org/public/file/P08142068/GivingReport2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DLG-LUGT]; see
also NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 2. The National Philanthropic Trust also reports a 20% average
payout. Id. at 6.
118. See FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 14.
119. See NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
120. Paul Arnsberger, Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS Data, 1 B.C. L. SCH. F. ON
PHILANTHROPY & THE PUB. GOOD 61, 67 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1017&context=philanthropy-forum [https://perma.cc/UGZ7-4ZNQ] (Figure D).
121. The IRS reports that the median payout for all donor advised funds (not just those held by
NSOs) is 10%. Paul Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable Organizations and Donor-Advised Funds,
2012, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, WINTER 2016 4 (2016).
This contrasts with the mean data reported by the National Philanthropic Trust for each of the
sponsoring organization categories: NSOs (21.4%); community foundations (18.2%); and singleissue charities (33.2%). NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. The IRS data is more
comprehensive because the IRS includes about twice the number of sponsoring organizations.
However, many of the organizations covered by the IRS (and likely not included in NPT data) are
small sponsoring organizations.
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out zero, the aggregate payout would be 20%. 122 In other words, donors
that distribute little to no money to charity from their DAFs would be
able to free ride on the high payouts of other donors.
Payout should be at the fund level for straightforward reasons. Donors
that create DAFs and do not advise a payout, or pay out very slowly, are
the main reason for requiring a payout. These are the donors that most
need a push to distribute funds to charity and who, for whatever reason,
are indecisive. The ability to use a DAF may be a benefit to the
indecisive donor, but the law should not tolerate unlimited indecision.
The point of the DAF is to distribute the money to a charity that can
use it.
Further, a mandated fund-based payout would standardize
expectations for NSOs and donors and end disputes about how payouts
are calculated and whether payouts are high enough. For DAFs that
already pay out at a high level, a mandate would not change behavior.
For DAFs that do not make substantial payouts, a mandate would
accelerate distributions, which would achieve the desired outcome.
Moreover, if the payout is objectionable to these donors, then what
are the consequences? One is that the donor instead funds a private
foundation—but this is not necessarily a bad outcome. If the donor’s
motives are to establish a perpetual institution, then the foundation is the
appropriate form. 123 Some might argue that donors should not be
encouraged to incur the expense of a private foundation, especially if the
main attraction of DAFs is their use as an alternative to private
foundations. 124 But, as discussed earlier, to the extent DAFs are used as
private foundation substitutes, the DAF represents a loophole, which a
high payout would close. In addition, some, perhaps many, donors that
now object to a payout might, once a payout is the law, accept it as
122. The payout would be determined by dividing total distributions ($2 million) by the
beginning of the year value ($10 million). This is the same payout formula used by the IRS and the
National Philanthropic Trust. Id. Fidelity uses a different formula to determine payout: distributions
for the year divided by the average aggregate asset value of the previous five years. Given the high
growth of Fidelity DAF funds over this period, a five-year average asset value has the effect of
shrinking the denominator and making aggregate payout appear larger.
123. Another possible alternative is that the donor instead contributes to a DAF at a community
foundation. In-depth discussion of how community foundations may be distinguished from national
sponsoring organizations is outside the scope of this Article but is an important issue.
124. The Treasury Department noted that “[a]necdotal reports suggest that some smaller private
foundations are being advised to consider choosing to ‘reorganize’ as DAFs by transferring all
assets to a DAF and terminating the private foundation.” TREASURY REPORT supra note 5, at 29. A
spend down of assets need not mean an end to foundation conversions, but would change the
calculation for small foundations, perhaps in a positive way. Foundations could trade for a less
expensive and restrictive regulatory environment but give up perpetual life.
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reasonable, along with the preferred tax status of the sponsoring
organization over a private foundation.
Another possible consequence of a fund-based payout is that some
donors might not give to charity at all. In other words, the payout could
have the effect policymakers should seek to avoid—driving away new
charitable donors and thus encouraging private consumption. But a
donor’s decision not to give because of a high fund-based payout also is
not a bad outcome in this context. Under present law, the donor has
taken a charitable deduction but is not distributing the money. The point
of the DAF at an NSO should be to attract new charitable money and
also to encourage donors to distribute it to charity. The DAF at an NSO
is a charitable distribution vehicle—that is the basis for the sponsor’s
exemption. Donors should know when giving that perpetuity is not an
option.
A final objection to a fund-based payout is that it would be an
administrative burden on the sponsoring organization. Sponsoring
organizations would have to calculate distribution requirements for each
fund, inform donors of their obligations, and make distributions when
donors fail to provide advice. 125 This would be a burden, and the costs
would undoubtedly be passed on to donor accounts through higher
administrative fees for account maintenance. Nevertheless, sponsoring
organizations already have access to account balance information and
the timing of contributions and distributions. Fidelity, for example,
reports that “[m]ost contributions to Fidelity Charitable are granted out
to charities within [ten] years, based on a first-in, first-out analysis of
contributions and grants.” 126 It should be within the competence of these
sophisticated financial intermediaries to track subaccount balances and
payouts over time, without creating an undue burden.
An alternative to a payout would be to delay the charitable deduction
until the DAF makes a distribution. Such an approach would in effect,
treat the sponsoring organization as a conduit or agent, thus emphasizing
substance over form. A similar approach has been used in other
circumstances. For example, in one case, a charity designated a public
utility as its authorized agent to collect voluntary contributions on the

125. One approach might be for NSOs to maintain annual subaccounts for each donor.
Contributions made during the year to the account would be added together and the account would
be closed to additional contributions at the end of the year. The account (including any gains) then
would be spent down within the spend-down period. A definition of a qualifying distribution also
would be required, for example, to prevent distributions from one DAF to another DAF.
126. See FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note 74, at 4.
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charity’s behalf from the utility’s customers. 127 The utility exercised no
dominion or control over the funds. The IRS held that the customers
were allowed a charitable deduction in the year the utility paid the funds
to the charity, not when the customer paid the funds to the utility. 128
Although NSOs do not act as authorized agents of the charities receiving
distributions, NSOs again are on the edge—relying in large part on legal
formalities for beneficial treatment.
Delaying the charitable deduction until the DAF distribution would
likely be as effective as a payout, if not more so, at speeding up
distributions. Indecisive donors generally would seek to accelerate
deductions and reach a decision far more quickly than with a multi-year
payout period. This approach, however, likely would have the effect of
ending the main appeal of the DAF at NSOs—a current deduction but
delayed decision. 129 Again, this is not necessarily a bad result, except to
the extent that DAF contributions represent new giving.
DAFs at NSOs are now a proven fundraising vehicle. Policymakers
should take steps to ensure that DAFs also become institutionalized as a
charitable distribution vehicle. Donors who are attracted by the
convenience and efficiency of NSOs will not be deterred by a reasonable
mandate to distribute deducted contributions over an appropriate period.
Donors who are deterred have other giving choices. Donors who choose
not to give are the donors who probably should not be receiving federal
income tax deductions for DAF contributions in any event. In short,
NSOs should be welcomed as a tool to promote a culture of giving, but
the welcome should be at arm’s length.
IV. A NET-BENEFIT APPROACH FOR NONCASH ASSET
CONTRIBUTIONS
A.

The Broken System of Noncash Asset Donations and the Growing
Role of DAFs

The DAF is emerging as a key source of noncash charitable
contributions. The Fidelity Charitable Gift fund reports that in 2015 twothirds of Fidelity Charitable donor contributions were made with
noncash assets, 130 “[n]early two-thirds of donors set up or use their

127.
128.
129.
130.

Rev. Rul. 85-184, 1985-2 C.B. 8.
Id.
Substantiation issues also would arise.
See FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
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DAFs to donate appreciated assets,” 131 and “[s]ince inception, Fidelity
Charitable has assisted in converting [$3] billion of illiquid assets into
charitable dollars available for grants.” 132 The National Philanthropic
Trust concurs, noting that: “contributing illiquid assets to donor-advised
funds continues to be an increasingly popular trend . . . .” 133 and that
donors are “utilizing assets . . . such as real estate, collections and
limited partnerships.” 134 Policymakers should take note. DAFs present
an opportunity to improve the current broken system of noncash
contributions.
Charitable contributions of noncash assets (property) are a longstanding source of concern, for reasons that have nothing to do with
donor advised funds. What began as a simple notion—a charitable
deduction for donated assets—has become an immensely complicated
cacophony of woefully nontransparent rules that are inefficient,
inequitable, promote abusive transactions, harm the reputation of the
nonprofit sector, and in many cases yield an uncertain benefit to charity.
The issues range from matters of pure policy to administration and
include: allowing a deduction for unrealized appreciation; uncertain
valuation of donated assets; the net benefit that inures to charity (the
donee); tax incentives that encourage property over cash contributions,
and the sheer complexity of the rules, which undermines transparency
and hinders compliance efforts for administrators and taxpayers alike.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to present each issue in
detail, 135 a brief summary of the rules and issues raised may be helpful
and is necessary to provide context. A simple example serves as a useful
starting point. Assume that a donor owns 100 shares of publicly traded
stock and donates the stock to a 501(c)(3) organization. At the time of
the donation, the stock is trading at ten dollars a share. What is the
donor’s deduction? The general rule is that a charitable deduction is
allowed for property contributions equal to the fair market value of the
property at the time of the contribution. 136 Thus, the deduction would be

131. See FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note 74, at 22.
132. See id. at 11; FIDELITY 2016 REPORT, supra note 16, at 12 ($3 billion of illiquid assets in
2016 is an increase of $600 million from $2.4 billion in 2015).
133. See NPT 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
134. See NPT 2015 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
135. For extensive discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A
Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263 (2013).
136. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2011).
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1,000 dollars. 137 This seems a reasonable result because the donor has
parted with property worth 1,000 dollars. But what if the donor paid only
one dollar for each share of stock, or 100 dollars total? If so, the donor is
allowed a 1000 dollar deduction (to shelter wage income) even though
the tax cost of the property was just 100 dollars. This ability to deduct
unrealized (i.e., untaxed) appreciation has been widely condemned. 138
In addition, what if within days of the donation, the stock value
plunges 65%? Worried about further devaluation of the stock, the donee
charity sells the stock for 350 dollars. Does the amount of the deduction
change? No, the deduction is based on date-of-contribution value of
1,000 dollars, not date of sale value. 139 This too may seem reasonable.
Someone has to bear the risk of loss. Since the donor has parted with
legal control of the asset, the risk of loss should pass to the donee as an
incident of ownership. On the other hand, it is not just the charity that
bears the risk of loss, but taxpayers generally. The taxpayers, through the
charitable deduction, have subsidized a gift of 1,000 dollars. If the actual
benefit to charity is less than 1,000 dollars, taxpayers bear some of the
burden by in effect overpaying for the donation. 140
What if instead of publicly traded stock, the donor contributes illiquid
property, like privately traded securities or real estate? Now, the rules
diverge based on the type of donee organization. If the illiquid property
is donated to a (non-operating) private foundation, then the deduction is
limited to the donor’s cost basis, i.e., the donor is not allowed to deduct
unrealized appreciation, and thus neither of the two issues above
matter. 141 If the illiquid property is donated to a public charity, then as

137. If the donor held the property for one year or less, then the deduction is equal to the donor’s
cost basis in the stock. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A).
138. Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 687, 720 (1999) (“inefficient and unfair”); Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy,
87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1158 (2008) (“inequitable”); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of
Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
(“inequitable”); Calvin H. Johnson, Ain’t Charity: Disallowing Deductions for Kept Resources, 128
TAX NOTES 545, 549 (2010) (a “mistake”); Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax—An
Enduring Puzzle, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 89 (2010) (“a clear error”); see also Harvey P. Dale
& Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX L. 331,
359 (2015) (noting that in 2011, 41% of noncash contributions were claimed by individuals earning
$1 million or more of adjusted gross income, or .747% of total returns).
139. I.R.C. § 170(a), (e) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1).
140. In this (admittedly dramatic) example, if the donor is in the 39.6% tax bracket, the donor
takes a $1000 deduction, which is worth $396 to the donor. The charity gets $350, meaning that it
cost the federal government $396 to deliver $350 to charity.
141. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii) . If the illiquid property is depreciated (i.e., has a value less than the
donor’s basis), then the deduction is fair market value and valuation still is a concern.

05 - Colinvaux.docx (Do Not Delete)

74

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/21/2017 2:42 PM

[Vol. 92:39

before, the donor is allowed to deduct unrealized appreciation based on
the date of contribution value. 142
In addition, unlike with publicly traded stock, illiquid assets raise the
stakes of relying on date of contribution value to determine the amount
of the deduction. The value of publicly traded stock, though variable
from day to day, at least is based on exchange value—a verifiable
amount equal to what buyers and sellers pay in market-based arm’s
length transactions. By contrast, illiquid assets do not have a similarly
objective measure for value. Unlike in a market transaction, where
buyers and sellers negotiate a value and a price, in a donative
transaction, market pressure is absent. Instead, the value of illiquid
assets must be determined by third-party appraisers, hired by the donor.
The donor has an incentive to inflate the value (because it leads to a
higher deduction). The donee is not responsible for valuing the asset,
and generally has an institutional interest in not challenging donor
valuations (so as not to alienate donors). Further, the donee also
generally benefits from a higher valuation, which increases on paper the
amount of public support received by the donee.
In short, in a donative transaction of illiquid assets to a public charity,
the principal check on valuation abuse is the Internal Revenue
Service. 143 For the IRS effectively to police property contributions is a
daunting task. Many overvaluations will go unchallenged. And
challenges, when mounted, are time consuming and expensive. 144 The
inherent uncertainty in valuation adds to the cost of the donation—in
administrative time and expense, and by overpaying for the subsidy.
Further, the cost of the donation should be viewed not just from the
perspective of the tax system and the public fisc, but also from the
donee’s perspective. Accepting property donations is not costless.
Donees incur carrying costs (maintenance, insurance, etc.) and expenses
related to sale. This again raises an incongruity between the net benefit
to charity from a donation, and the amount allowed as a deduction,
which again, is based on an uncertain date of contribution value. 145
142. An appraisal is required. The appraisal must be dated no earlier than sixty days before the
contribution and no later than the due date for filing the return. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3).
143. The secondary check on valuation is the integrity of the appraisal process. The regulations
define appraisal standards. In addition, there are penalties on donors (and appraisers) for
overvaluation, all in an effort to get to an accurate value of contributed property. I.R.C. §§ 6662,
6695A .
144. For extensive discussion, see Colinvaux supra note 135, at 282–89.
145. The industry relating to processing noncash contributions is substantial. Consider the
website for Charitable Solutions, LLC, a “planned giving risk management consulting firm” that
focuses on noncash asset receipt and disposition, among other services. The firm notes on its home
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In addition, another set of rules applies if the property is tangible
personal property, like clothing, household items, collectibles, or
artwork. If this type of property is given to a private foundation, the
donor is limited to a deduction of basis (unless the property is worth less
than the donor’s basis, in which case the deduction is the fair-market
value of the property). 146 If made to a public charity, a fair-market value
deduction is allowed if the property is for the donee’s use in exempt
programs (known as a “related use”). 147 Otherwise, the deduction is
limited to the donor’s basis. 148 In addition, special rules exist for certain
types of tangible personal property (vehicles, fractional interests of
artwork, taxidermy) adding to the overall complexity. 149 There are also
distinct rules for contributions of inventory and intangible property. 150
The DAF enters this array of rules as a magnet for noncash
contributions of all kinds, but especially of illiquid assets.151 As a public
charity, contributions to DAF sponsoring organizations receive the more
favorable treatment—the ability to deduct unrealized appreciation 152—
than the same contribution to a private foundation. 153 This is one reason
to believe that for some contributions, donors may use a DAF instead of
a private foundation. 154
page that noncash donations are one of only “two types of gifts in which a charity can actually lose
more money than the original gift.” The firm has a relationship with the Dechomai Foundation,
which “assists charitable organizations and donors in the often-daunting process of receiving,
managing, liquidating and finally granting proceeds from non-cash donations.” The Dechomai
Foundation, DECHOMAI, www.dechomai.org [https://perma.cc/GV3H-Q3ZU]; see also Charitable
Solutions LLC, CHARITABLE SOLUTIONS www.charitablesolutionsllc.com [https://perma.cc/VBB2WA84].
146. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i).
147. Id. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i)(I).
148. As with private foundations, if the property is worth less than the donor’s basis, the
deduction is fair market value.
149. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iv); id. § 170(f)(12); id. § 170(o).
150. Id. § 170(e)(3); id. § 170(m).
151. Fidelity reports that “[t]hree-quarters of donors say the ability to donate [noncash] assets is a
reason they set up or use a donor-advised fund” FIDELITY 2015 REPORT supra note 74, at 4.
152. Fidelity reports that 78% of donors use or set up a DAF “[t]o potentially minimize capital
gains taxes.” Id. at 22.
153. Property contributions to public charities also are subject to a more generous cap (30% of
adjusted gross income) than property contributions to private foundations (20% of adjusted gross
income). I.R.C. § 170(b) (2012).
154. In general, for tax planning purposes, it would make sense to give cash and public securities
to the private foundation and illiquid assets to the DAF. The DAF then could fund the same causes
as the private foundation (under the donor’s name), and the private foundation could make
distributions to the DAF in satisfaction of the foundation’s payout requirement (DAFs are subject to
the excess business holdings rules, meaning that they cannot be used to avoid this aspect of the
private foundation regime.).
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As one example, in marketing materials Fidelity relays the experience
of a donor who was preparing to sell his interest in a privately held
company:
I wanted to create an ongoing charitable concern, something to
serve as a legacy for me and my whole family. I thought first of
establishing a private foundation, but found there were two
problems: one, that donating privately held stock to a private
foundation is not a tax-efficient option; and two, that the
administrative challenges were considerable and expensive.
Establishing a DAF at the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund was
absolutely the best option. 155
Apart from tax advantages, which sponsoring organizations share
with any other public charity, sponsoring organizations market
themselves as the more efficient vehicle for converting complex assets
into cash, and increasing the net benefit to charity. Again, according to
Fidelity:
Many nonprofit organizations, being primarily mission- and
program-focused, are not well equipped to handle this type of
contribution [(non-publicly traded assets)] . . . . Furthermore,
while some charitable organizations might have some limited
experience in handling contributions of complex assets, the cost
to the charity to outsource the compliance and liquidation work
can be considerable. Although the donor would still be eligible
to claim a fair market value deduction, the net result to the
charity would once again be significantly reduced . . . . In many
cases, an optimal method for donating complex assets to
charity—measured by cost, flexibility, simplicity, and tax
benefits to the donor, as well as by maximizing the net proceeds
ultimately made available to charitable organizations—is to
make the contribution to a charity that offers donor[]advised
funds. 156
155. Karla D’Alleva Valas, Donating Complex Assets to Charity, FIDELITY CHARITABLE,
http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-strategies/tax-estate-planning/donate-non-publicly-tradedassets.shtml [https://perma.cc/9TE6-FXFJ].
156. Id. (emphasis added). The other major national gift funds have similar materials. Ann Gill,
Donating Illiquid Assets: Non-Publicly Traded Stock, VANGUARD CHARITABLE (May 20, 2015),
https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/blog/blog_donating_illiquid_assets_non_publicly_traded_
stock/ [https://perma.cc/65A4-RWWT] (“Many charities—especially small to mid-sized ones—do
not have the resources to accept this type of asset.”); Barbara Benware, Why it Might Make Sense to
Donate Your Best Investments Instead of Cash: Appreciated Assets Can Be Among the Most TaxAdvantaged Items to Contribute to Charity, SCHWAB CHARITABLE, https://www.schwab
charitable.org/public/file/P-5260825 [https://perma.cc/D843-PXM7] (“Unfortunately, not all
charities have the resources or capabilities to accept gifts of appreciated investments directly. That’s
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In other words, Fidelity argues that donors with complex assets
should, as a matter of public interest, give to a DAF instead of another
public charity. Other public charities are not in the business of buying
and selling assets and so will drive up the costs of the transaction,
resulting in less benefit to charity. It is much better, Fidelity says, to give
the asset to a DAF sponsoring organization, have the sponsoring
organization sell the asset, and then distribute the proceeds to charity
from the donor’s DAF account—less “any applicable unrelated business
income tax[,] . . . actual carrying and maintenance costs, and certain tax
preparation consultancy costs,” 157 which are taken from the proceeds of
the sale. In either case, the donor’s deduction will be the same—and
based on the date of contribution value. But if a DAF is used, the amount
actually distributed to a “mission” or “program” focused charity will be
greater.
The marketing materials are suggestive. Clearly, sponsoring
organizations are competing for the noncash contribution business, 158
indicating that many DAF contributions are substitutes (both for other
public charity gifts, and private foundation giving), not new giving.
More important though is the likely trend: “Until recently, non-publicly
traded assets were a largely untapped source of philanthropic funding,
in part because these assets can be complicated for individuals to give
and for some nonprofits to accept.” 159
As a hint of untapped sources of funding to come, Fidelity cites to a
report by Deloitte Consulting, which states that: “the top 1% of all U.S.
households hold 36% of their wealth in privately held businesses.” 160 In
short, Fidelity believes that the DAF is the uniquely appropriate vehicle

where donor-advised fund accounts can come in handy. These charitable accounts . . . allow you to
more easily convert appreciated investments into tax-effective charitable contributions. This is
because the sponsoring charity may have more experience with these types of gifts and can be in a
better position to evaluate prospective contributions of appreciated property and liquidate the
property once it is donated.”); Illiquid Asset Contribution Guidelines, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC
TRUST, http://www.nptrust.org/daf-forms/Illiquid-Asset-Contribution-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VB5M-CK3V].
157. D’Alleva Valas, supra note 155. Other gift funds have similar models.
158. The Fidelity materials say that the mission-driven public charity “might require that a donor
first sell the assets and contribute the proceeds. A donor in this situation would have taxable income
and thus would not, in most cases, choose to donate the entire amount of the proceeds . . . .” Id.
159. See FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note at 74, at 11 (emphasis added).
160. Id. (citing The Next Decade in Global Giving Among Millionaire Households, DELOITTE
CONSULTING, LLP (2011)).
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for attracting new charitable contributions of complex assets, and that
the potential market is significant. 161
Further, the target property is varied. In The Art of Donating
Property, Vanguard Charitable promotes the contributions of “fine art,
real estate, vehicles, and other illiquid assets.” 162 In “Donating Complex
Assets for Charitable Giving” Vanguard Charitable lists a number of
primary asset types, including non-publicly traded stock, an LLC or LLP
interest, private equity, hedge fund interest, restricted stock, insurance
policy, and “other.” 163 Schwab Charitable has a similar list, with the
addition of “collectibles and artwork.” 164 The Boston Foundation noted
the gift of a share in a cruise ship. 165
The push by sponsoring organizations, especially NSOs, for noncash
contributions raises another legal question regarding their 501(c)(3)
status. As already discussed, NSOs as primarily fundraising
organizations are at the edge of 501(c)(3) exempt status. As little more
than a holding company, an NSO must avoid characterization as a feeder
organization, 166 spend in accordance with its resources, and must remain
vigilant against private benefit and inurement from relationships with

161. Of total contributions to Fidelity in 2014, 9% were of non-publicly traded assets, 46% were
publicly traded securities, and 45% cash. FIDELITY 2015 REPORT, supra note at 74, at 11. Fidelity is
not alone in this belief, as the marketing materials of other sponsoring organizations suggest.
162. Ann Gill, The Art of Donating Property, VANGUARD CHARITABLE (February 25, 2015),
https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/blog/blog_the_art_of_donating_property/
[https://perma.cc/296W-2WQX].
163. Donating Complex Assets for Charitable Giving, VANGUARD CHARITABLE, https://
www.vanguardcharitable.org/individuals/make_a_contribution/special_assets [https://perma.cc/8V
KE-REF7].
164. See Benware, supra note 156. See also, supra note 117. The donation of art and collectibles
that are worth less than the donor’s basis are deductible at fair market value. Although valuation is a
concern, donors are not able to deduct unrealized appreciation. If the property is appreciated
property, however, then a fair market value deduction is allowed (i.e., donors may deduct unrealized
appreciation) only if the property is for the related use of the donee. Some sponsoring organizations
may be using other intermediaries to satisfy the related use test. See Gill, supra note 162. In The Art
of Donating Property, Gill describes one donation of fine art, where Vanguard partnered with a forprofit company and a related foundation to process the art donation and transfer the proceeds to the
donor’s DAF at Vanguard. The details are not clear—but illustrate the fact that multiple entities can
be involved—perhaps for tax planning purposes.
165. Valuing Non-Cash Assets for Charity: What Donors Need to Know, BOSTON FOUND.,
http://www.tbf.org/tbf/65/complex-assets [https://perma.cc/5BQB-DAUC] (noting that “[t]he
Internal Revenue Service requires that [non-cash] assets be valued, a sometimes difficult task for
things like illiquid company stock, land, privately held corporations or anything else not price by a
public market”).
166. As noted in note 99, supra, an organization that conducts a for-profit business and turns all
profits to charity is classified as a feeder organization and ineligible for 501(c)(3) status. I.R.C.
§ 502.
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affiliated for-profit investment firms. A deepening involvement in
managing complex asset donations further muddies the waters.
For example, in two private letter rulings, the IRS considered and
rejected the 501(c)(3) status of organizations that were formed to
facilitate donations of noncash property. In a 2005 ruling, an
organization sought exemption as “a facilitator to contributors who want
to donate tangible personal property, such as boats, to a charity that the
donors designate.” 167 The IRS said that:
Arranging for donors for the charitable contribution of their
boats, by taking possession and title to the boats; by arranging
with third parties for their moorage, for necessary repairs and
upgrades, and for sales by brokers; and by paying the net sales
proceeds to the charity designated by the donor, all constitute
common commercial activities, rather than activities that further
a charitable purpose. 168
The IRS concluded that the organization was “organized and operated
for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business[],”
i.e., a feeder organization. 169 Similarly, in a 2008 ruling the question
raised was: “Does an organization formed to facilitate donations of real
estate qualify for exemption” 170 under section 501(c)(3)? The IRS said
that “[t]he facilitation of real estate transactions through for-profit third
party entities for a fee constitutes a trade or business ordinarily carried
on for profit.” 171
On the surface, the comparison of these failed 501(c)(3) organizations
to sponsoring organizations is obvious. Sponsoring organizations are
engaged in the same basic activities as the organizations in the rulings—
liquidating property. But there are important possible distinctions. A key
conclusion for the IRS in both rulings was that the organizations were
deemed to be the agents of the donor, which imbued the sales activity
with more of a commercial hue. 172 Thus, the organization was judged to
be providing commercial services for the donor (and also, incidentally,
would have sheltered the donor from capital gains taxes). Whether
sponsoring organizations can be characterized as agents for their donors
returns to the essential nature of “donor advice” in the DAF context.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200512027 (Mar. 25, 2005).
Id.
Id.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200825051 (June 20, 2008).
Id.
Id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200512027 (Mar. 25, 2005).
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Another distinction is that the organizations in the rulings did not
engage in other activities. 173 Sponsoring organizations are not
exclusively in the noncash asset business. But as this business
increasingly becomes a primary activity, if it is not already, 174 the
charitable purposes of sponsoring organizations will again be called into
question.
All of this leads to questions about how policymakers should respond
to the increasing use of sponsoring organizations to process noncash
charitable contributions. As the sponsoring organizations state, there are
reasons to think that they are a more efficient vehicle than other public
charities for accepting many kinds of noncash contributions, especially
illiquid assets. Because sponsoring organizations specialize in the
liquidation of complex assets, they are better positioned to reduce
transaction costs, potentially making more cash available to missiondriven charities.
In addition, the ability to liquidate a complex asset for the benefit of
multiple charities is also an attractive feature of using a DAF in this
context. Without a DAF, the contribution of indivisible property must go
to a single charity (if tax benefits are to be preserved). 175 Further,
because many mission-driven charities are not in a good position to
accept and dispose of complex assets, the market for complex asset
donations is likely depressed. 176 The sophistication offered by many
sponsoring organizations likely does represent an opportunity to release
an “untapped” source of charitable contributions. 177

173. The extent to which sponsoring organizations rely on for-profit firms to process transactions
may also be a distinction. Schwab says that it accepts noncash assets “via a charitable intermediary,
with proceeds of your donation transferred to your donor-advised account upon liquidation.”
SCHWAB CHARITABLE, supra note 117, at 4 (fine print).
174. Fidelity in 2014 received more contributions in noncash assets than cash. FIDELITY 2015
REPORT, supra note 74, at 11.
175. SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that a “DAF can permit the contribution
of a large indivisible appreciated property such as real estate. When property is not divisible, the
contribution cannot be spread across many charitable donors or donated over time”).
176. Non-Cash Donations, CHARITABLE SOLUTIONS, http://charitablesolutionsllc.com/non-cashdonations/ [https://perma.cc/JS7F-VHLU] (noting that charities sometimes refuse gifts because they
lack expertise, time or staff).
177. See Lewis B. Cullman, The Charitable Funds that Benefit Rich Donors and the Financial
Industry, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/raw-dealtaxpayer-donor-advised-funds-becoming-americas-largest-charities/ [https://perma.cc/L5ST-CZ4P]
(noting that “[o]ne proponent of DAFs has referred to this exploitation of previously untapped
resources as ‘philanthropic fracking’”).This strengthens the case that here, donor advised funds may
be vehicles for giving that would otherwise not occur, but only to the extent that donors of complex
assets do not reduce other contributions.
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On the other hand, as yet more complex, and inherently difficult-tovalue assets are contributed, the opportunities for abuse will multiply, as
will administrative costs, overpayments of the subsidy by the federal
government, and equitable concerns that the deduction favors the
wealthiest. The charitable deduction already is claimed
disproportionately by those at the very top of the income distribution. 178
DAFs, by providing a lucrative deduction for the top 1%, 179 will put
further pressure on the charitable deduction generally.
B.

A Net-Benefit-to-Charity Approach to Noncash Assets

Congress could respond in any number of ways. Least attractive is to
do nothing. As outlined above, the system for property contributions is
broken, notwithstanding some positive features of using DAFs in this
context. 180 So, some response is warranted.
To fashion a response, Congress should begin by taking note of first
principles. In theory, as a matter of income measurement, no charitable
deduction should be allowed for unrealized appreciation. 181 The ability
to deduct unrealized appreciation is no more and no less than a subsidy,
the presumed intent of which is to encourage asset owners to transfer
wealth to charity. To be sure, it is a longstanding and popular subsidy,
but also one that is about to get more expensive with the rise of DAFs.
DAFs thus provide an opening to question whether to keep the subsidy
at all. 182
For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that policymakers want to
continue to subsidize noncash charitable contributions. 183 Nonetheless,
178. See HUSOCK, supra note 84.
179. See Siegel, supra note 100.
180. As noted above, however, as sponsoring organizations become more deeply engaged in the
business of selling assets, the more doubt is cast on exempt status. Unrelated business income tax
issues are could arise.
181. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
372 (1972); see also HUSOCK, supra note 84.
182. STAFF OF JUDICIAL COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 293–307 (Comm. Print 2005) (recommending
elimination of the subsidy); see Halperin, supra note 138 (arguing for a constructive realization of
gain upon contribution). The author has argued elsewhere that the charitable deduction for property
contributions should be viewed as a distinct tax expenditure with high tangible and intangible costs.
See Colinvaux, supra note 135. The Article argues that if a charitable contribution for property is
allowed, it should be only in cases where there is a measurable benefit to charity.
183. But see A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Provide for Comprehensive
Tax Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 113th Cong. Sess. 2
(Dec. 10, 2014) (introduced by Dave Camp) (ending the ability to deduct unrealized appreciation
for real estate and privately held securities).
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with DAFs, tolerance for a deduction determined by an appraised value
may finally be untenable. Sponsoring organizations operate complex
donation programs primarily to liquidate donated property to cash. With
a system emerging in the marketplace for intermediaries to accept and
liquidate noncash property, there is a strong case that a deduction, if
allowed, should be based on the net benefit to charity (i.e., the amount
made available for distribution from the donor advised fund), not the
appraised amount. Thus, Congress should take the rise of the DAF
giving vehicle as an opportunity to improve the system for noncash
contributions (i.e., not just contributions to DAFs but to any charity) by
reducing the costs of the subsidy and moving to a “net benefit to charity”
approach to the deduction.
A net-benefit-to-charity approach for the deduction aligns the
deduction with the amount that goes to the (active) charity. As a result,
donee organizations would have incentives to reduce transaction costs in
order to maximize donor deductions. Donors would be more likely to
give noncash assets to donee organizations that have the most efficient
liquidation programs (meaning, in many cases, sponsoring
organizations). If property does not sell for as much as donors hope or
anticipate, the government (and so other taxpayers) will not be
shortchanged by overpaying for the contribution. 184 Further, the net
benefit to charity approach is not new, but is used in the context of
vehicles 185 and intellectual property. 186
That said, a net-benefit-to-charity approach would raise a number of
issues. What is the deduction if the donee does not sell the property?
Should there be a forced sale rule? Should the net-benefit approach
apply to all noncash assets or only those where valuation is a problem, or
assets above a minimum value? Should there continue to be special rules
for related use property? These are all important questions that would
require answers once there is agreement to move to a net benefit
approach.
To see how a net-benefit approach might work, one general rule (the
“Rule”) could be that the deduction for contributions of noncash assets
to a public charity is equal to the lesser of: (1) the donor’s basis in the
property plus one half of the appreciation (the “Initial Amount”); or (2)
184. See, e.g., Illiquid Asset Contribution Guidelines, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, supra note
156 (cautioning donors that “[d]ue to the amount of time required to liquidate the asset, sales
proceeds may differ from the appraised or fair market value at the time of the contribution”).
185. I.R.C. § 170(f)(12) (2012) (basing amount of deduction for vehicles on sales price).
186. Id. §§ 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), (m) (allowing an initial deduction of basis, to increase in later years
based on income from the contribution to the donee).
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the net benefit to charity. The net benefit to charity would be determined
based on: (1) in the case of a contribution to a sponsoring organization,
the amount made available for distribution from the DAF by donor
advice; or (2) in the case of another public charity, the net sales
proceeds. In the case of depreciated property, the Initial Amount would
be the fair market value. The deduction could be allowed in the year of
contribution, subject to recapture in the year the net benefit to charity
can be determined, with a limit on recapture of a specified period from
the contribution date. Although the Initial Amount of the subsidy (basis
plus one-half the appreciation) may seem arbitrary, it is no less arbitrary
in this context than fair market value, just not as generous. Further, the
Initial Amount already is used as the allowable amount for certain
contributions of inventory, and so has some precedent. 187
The Rule could be applied to any type of noncash asset, with
appropriate adjustments. Applying the Rule to publicly traded securities,
the amount of the deduction would be reduced from the exchange value
(present law) to the exchange value less one-half of the appreciation. 188
Donors would still be able to deduct some of the appreciation in the
property (i.e., the subsidy would not be eliminated), but not all. If the
donee sold the securities for less than the Initial Amount, then the
amount of the deduction would be reduced accordingly. If the
contribution and sale occur in the same tax year of the donor, then no
recapture would be required. 189 For publicly traded securities, the limit
on recapture could be one year after the contribution date, meaning that
if the donee sold the securities more than one year later, there would be
no recapture and the donor’s deduction would be the initial amount
(basis plus one-half of the appreciation).
Applying the Rule to illiquid noncash assets like real estate and
privately held securities, 190 the Initial Amount would be the donor’s
basis plus one-half of the appreciation based on the appraised value. In
general, the recapture period for illiquid assets should be longer than one
year to account for the additional time it may take to dispose of the
property. The net benefit to charity would be determined by reducing the
187. Id. § 170(e)(3) (2016).
188. Some might argue that there is no reason to apply the rule to publicly traded assets, because
valuation is not a problem. The reason to reduce the subsidy for the contribution of publicly traded
assets is not to curtail abuse, but simply to reduce the cost of a generous subsidy.
189. As a practical matter, to avoid recapture and close the transaction, many donees would sell
the property in the year of contribution. Non-sponsoring organization donees that prefer to retain the
securities could do so, and the donor’s deduction would be fixed at the initial amount.
190. Some publicly traded securities could fall into this category if the securities were subject to
substantial restrictions.
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sales proceeds by the costs associated with carrying and selling the
property. Sponsoring organizations already make similar calculations in
determining how much to charge each DAF for the contribution. 191 The
principal difference, then, is a reduction in the amount of the deduction
from full-appraised value to the Initial Amount, not to exceed the net
benefit to charity.
Applying the Rule to tangible personal property requires some
additional consideration. As noted, the general rule is that, for
appreciated property, the deduction is the donor’s basis unless the
property is for the related use of the donee. 192 In general, contributions to
a sponsoring organization will not be for a related use, so already the
allowable amount is just the donor’s basis. 193 The Rule should not be
applied to increase the deduction.
Otherwise, the question is whether the subsidy should be reduced
from appraised value to the Initial Amount for related-use property. A
full discussion is outside the scope of this Article, 194 but as an initial
matter, related-use property should not be treated differently from other
property. For tangible personal property that is depreciated, the Rule
might apply only to items of property with a minimum value; 195
otherwise a net benefit to charity calculation might not be feasible. 196
Over decades, Congress has wrestled with the correct deduction
amount for charitable contributions of noncash assets, resulting in a
multitude of scenarios. 197 DAFs present Congress with an opportunity
191. Non-sponsoring organization public charities would have to track these amounts.
192. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
193. If a sponsoring organization accepted property it intended to use in a charitable activity
related to its exempt purpose, then a fair market value deduction would be available. But as
discussed, sponsoring organizations typically accept property not to use, but to liquidate.
194. Related use property presents a slightly different challenge from other property. The main
issue is that the subsidy here is, or should be, intended to deliver a specific type of property to
charity (e.g., art to an art museum). The question then is the efficient level of the subsidy for the
particular market.
195. As noted supra, sponsoring organizations actively solicit tangible personal property like
collectibles and artwork. See also NPT 2014 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that many
sponsoring organizations “are willing to accept . . . real estate and tangible personal property.
Typically, [they] liquidate them relatively quickly . . . .”). Sponsoring organizations also generally
require a minimum value for complex assets. Thus, applying a net benefit to charity approach
should not impose a significant new burden on sponsoring organizations, which already screen for
appropriate contributions and track costs.
196. Low value clothing and household items are an example. Donor advised funds appear to be
used rarely for this type of property, however, leaving a more fulsome discussion for other
occasions. TREASURY REPORT supra note 5, at 61 (reporting a total of 142 donations in 2005 of
clothing and household items, with a total value of $129,000, all at community foundations).
197. See supra notes 135–50 and accompanying text.
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both to embrace the vehicle as an efficient mechanism for converting
complex assets to cash for the benefit of charity, and also to improve the
system of noncash contributions and reduce its many costs.
CONCLUSION
Donor advised funds attract a significant share of charitable giving,
are growing rapidly, and warrant the attention of policymakers. The
DAF is hard to conceptualize. The different types of DAF sponsors and
the different reasons donors give make it difficult to design a regulatory
approach for all DAFs. Important considerations are that contributions to
DAFs are substitutes for giving to other public charities and private
foundations but also represent new gifts.
The national sponsoring organization emerges as distinct from other
sponsors. The exempt purpose of the NSO is to spend money for the
benefit of other 501(c)(3) organizations and is best characterized as a
fundraising organization. Given the NSO’s exempt purpose, the NSO
already is subject to a facts-and-circumstances-based payout—the
commensurate in scope test. Because NSOs fundamentally are vehicles
for spending, not saving, the IRS by regulation, or Congress through
legislation, should apply the commensurate in scope test and require that
NSOs ensure contributed funds are distributed over a specified time
period. The goal of the payout is to provide a distribution period long
enough so as not to alienate new donors, but short enough so as not to
unduly extend the delay to charity that results when DAFs are used as
public charity substitutes.
Congress also should recognize that DAFs increasingly are used for
noncash charitable contributions. The positive effect will be to make
property conversions more efficient. The negative effect will be to
accentuate an already-broken system of property contributions at great
expense: increasing the cost of the subsidy, straining administration of
the charitable deduction, and exacerbating equity concerns. Assuming
that Congress intends to retain the subsidy for noncash contributions,
Congress should use DAFs as an opportunity to reduce the cost of the
subsidy of the entire system (not just DAF contributions) and move to a
net-benefit-to-charity approach to the deduction.

